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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
n Wh.o lays hold of something permanent in ravenous time
and fixes it in the word ?" 1 Man dwelling poetically. Man
dwelling in such a way as to illumine the things that are,
and to cast the light of his questioning into the darkness
from which they spring.
The poet names the mystery and then is silent:
At the still point of the turning world
Where past and future are gathered. „ .
....... Except for the point, the still point,
There would be no dance, and there is only the dance.
2
The philosopher speaks the word and then asks the question.
Without Being, whose unfathomable and unmanifest
essence is vouchsafed us by Nothing in essential
dread, everything that "is ' 1 would remain in
Beinglessness ( Seln-loslgkelt ) .3
What of this darkness from which things spring? Is it
other than man, or is it the darkness of unmeaning—the
darkness of the unspoken word? And do we even care?
^Martin Heidegger, "Holderlin and the Essence of
Poetry”, tr. Douglas Scott, Werner Brock, ed. , Existence
and Being (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 194-9) , p. 280 .
2T
.
S. Eliot, ’’Burnt Norton", Four Quartets (New York:
Harcourt Brace & World, Inc., 194-3), p. 5.
^Martin Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?" tr. R. F. C.
Hull and Alan Crick, Werner Brock, ed. , on. clt . , pp. 353 -4 .
2When Heidegger suggests that we ’’raise anew the question
of the meaning of Being" he does so because he sees a for-
getting of Being5 that is at once an estrangement from Self^
and a not caring. The meaning of Being is either too ob-
vious or too obscure to pursue. But man is distinguished
from other entities in the world by the fact that he does
^Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , tr. John Macquarrie
and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers,
1962), p. 19 (l)o (Numbers in parentheses, following the
page references to Being and Time , refer to pagination in
later German editions of Sein und Zeit .)
^Ehe words Being , being , entity , and Pasein are so
frequently encountered in this work that it seems advisable
to make distinctions between them at the outset. My own
interpretation of Heidegger* s meaning is: That thread of
highly conscious human existence which runs through history
is the presence of Being ( Sein ) ; the particular entity
( Selendes ) in the world which tries, through its way of
being ( seiend ) , to make explicit this presence, and is thus
responsible for history, is Basein ( Being-there )
.
Heidegger himself says" ’’ Entities are grasped in their
Being as ‘presence* ; this means that they are understood
with regard to a definite mode of time--the ‘Present 1 /*dle
"Gegenwart"27. M Ibid ., p. 47 (25).
Problems with these words will be encountered also, and
for a number of reasons: l) Each translator uses different
terminology (which I will attempt to point out where it dif-
fers radically from that which I am using). Thus the quo-
tations will differ from one to the other and I am not com-
petent to refer to the German for purposes of comparison;
2) Within a single work, a translator frequently gives evi-
dence of his own uncertainty in the choice of a particular
form (some of these are obvious enough to point out—many
more are not) ; 3) The words as used in the text are chosen
to convey my own understanding which, when made explicit,
is at best both a revealing and a concealing of the meaning
Heidegger sought to bestow.
6fhe use of the upper case "S" here signifies the
authentic Self as distinguished from the inauthentic or
"everyday" self which we will meet in Chapter II.
3seek to understand himself and his world and he cannot
abandon essential questioning without suffering alienation.
Heidegger argues that since man's being is a pre-requisite
to his questioning, an understanding of that being is nec-
essary for an understanding of the search and its findings.
Modern man has tried to understand Being through entities
other than himself—through entities which he is not
. with-
out first making a thorough study of that which precedes
the investigation and makes it possible—his own primordial
under standing.
When historical man's investigations have been grounded
in awareness of, and consideration of, that primordial under-
standing, his words have given Being a place in the world.
The history of man's thought is given brilliance and whole-
ness by the persistent recurrence, if not continuous dwell-
ing, of the truth of Being. let is it possible that this
very brilliance owes its Being to the background of dark-
ness against which it shows—the darkness of misunderstand-
ing also made explicit, or of the silence of the unspoken
word?
Heidegger has said that M we, mankind, are a conversa-
tion ... a single conversation"? and that our historical
existence and our existence as a conversation "belong
?"Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry", Werner Brock,
on. clt . , pp. 277-9.
4together and are the same thing”. 8 I have taken this as a
warrant for bringing into my work, peripherally, the speak-
ing of Eastern man. The differences between cultural tra-
ditions, as well as between individuals within a tradition,
may well be, as Radhakrishnan has said, "but different
dialects of a single speech of the soul.
. . . differences
due to accents, historical circumstances, and stages of
development . "9 if each tradition is but a unique response
to the problems and questions which confront all men, then
perhaps we can find help in easing our sense of alienation
by listening for the voice of Being speaking out of the
larger tradition—the tradition to which the words "a single
conversation” attest—the tradition of man.
The human and ontological problems are one, in
Heidegger, with the problem of language, hence the examina-
tion and revitalization of language is an essential element
in the project of reviving the relationship between man and
Being.
8Ibid.
9s. Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought
(London: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 350.
It is perhaps relevant, at this point, to mention that
Heidegger is reputed to have said, after reading the work of
Daisetz Suzuki, "If I understand this man correctly, this is
what I have been- trying to say in all my writings." (See
D. T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism , ed., William Barrett /Hew York:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956/, p. xi.) Barrett’s comment
is: "This remark may be the slightly exaggerated enthusiasm
of a man under the impact of a book in which he recognizes
some of his own thoughts; . . . yet the points of correspond-
ence between the two, despite their disparate sources, are
startling ..."
5Heidegger Has referred to our time as a time of need,
as the "No-more of the gods that have fled and the Not-yet
of the god that is coming." 10 It is a time characterized
by: l) the need to go "beyond the God-murdering time of
Nietzsche into a time when God is as irrelevant as the
gods" 1
1
;
and 2) the need to hold open the dimension of
mystery so that there will be a place for unconcealment to
occur— a place into which Dasein can throw the light of his
questioning to illumine the things that are and thus bring
them out of the darkness. Thomas Langan has said that to
be delivered from his alienation, "man must first rethink
the tradition sufficiently to feel painfully the Need." 12
This rethinking starts with a rethinking of Being in
relation to Self, to the Nothing, and to Language, for it
is Heidegger r s thesis that Being is drawn out of Nothing
and revealed in the world through the originative act of
man speaking and thus bestowing meaning.
1°"Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry", Werner Brock,
op. cjt ., p. 289.
1 "'Thomas Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger (New York:
Columbia University Press , 1959) V P« 208.
1 2Ibid
. ,
p. 204.
BEING AND SELF
CHAPTER II
BEING AND SELF
In accordance with the hidden message of the beginning,
man should be understood, within the question of being,
as the site which being requires in order to disclose
itself. Man is the site of openness, the there
. The
essent juts into this there and is fulfilled. Hence
we say that man’s being is in the strict sense of the
word "being- there"
.
1 3
Martin Heidegger studies man in the light of thought
which calls itself "fundamental ontology".*'^ Insofar as he
starts from human existence—without any prior assumptions
about human nature or man’s essence
— ,
confronts the human
situation in its totality, and asks the question of how man
13Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics
,
tr
.
Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959)
»
p. 205. The translator of this work uses the Latin "essent"
for both the participle "being" ( seiend ) and the substantive
"entity" ( seiendes ) , and uses "being 11 with a lower case "b"
for the "Being 11 CSein) used by Macquarrie and Robinson. I
feel that this is an unfortunate substitution in that it
creates the impression of a radical separation of being and
Being, while it is, I believe, the intention of Heidegger to
show their interdependence. It is unfortunate also in that
the word "essent"
,
when used in an English translation, does
not perform the participial function as well as does the
word "being".
In quotations from this work (and from others where
necessary) I have enclosed the original German (appearing in
the translation) in crossed brackets £.
3
in order to dis-
tinguish both from parenthetic inclusions of Heidegger and
bracketed inclusions of my own.
1 ^Heidegger uses "fundamental ontology" to distinguish
the task of clarification of the meaning of Being itself
from that inquiry into the Being of entities which is gen-
erally named "ontology".
8can find meaning in the face of his finiteness, Heidegger
can be called an existential philosopher. But these elements
of his work do not stand alone. In the search for Being,
the existential questions are one with the ontological since
man is both the seeker and the field of search:
We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. TheBeing of any such entity is in each case mine.
• *•••••••
The ess ence of /^hls entity/7 Dasein lies in’ Its
existence
. j ]
"—
‘
Thus Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as aninstance or special case of some genus of entities as
things that are present-at-hand . ^
5
Ontical man may be studied by the special sciences but
in his ontological character, as the locus of Being, he can-
not be so studied. We cannot feel that we have exhausted
^Belng and Time
, pp. 67-8 (42). For clarification of
the term "present-at-hand M
,
see p. 16, n. 31, infra. Here
it Is perhaps enough to relate "present-at-hand H to the dis-
tinction between ontological and ontical. Entities are
interpreted ontologically with regard to their basic state
of Being, and are interpreted ontically with regard to their
observable, measurable, testable characterist ics--their
present-at-hand character. I have used Heidegger’s termin-
ology throughout this work. This is not done without recog-
nition of the problem It presents to the reader unfamiliar
with Heidegger, but to deliberately avoid using it would be
to miss the point of much of what Heidegger is attempting to
do. He chose to use terms which are cumbersome but essen-
tially in keeping with his expressed hope of restoring to
language the purity and vitality of its first speaking. If
the difference between entities in their present-at-hand
character and their ready-t o-hand character is not under-
stood, then the speaking of Heidegger will have to wait on
that understanding. As long as man insists on binding his
thinking with the restrictions of Greek logic, it may well
be that Being will remain concealed from him. "Obedient to
the voice of Being, thought seeks the Word through which the
truth of Being may be expressed." ("What is Metaphysics?"
Werner Brock, op. cit
. , p. 360.)
9the possibilities for knowing him by moving around him and
examining him with the methods of psychology, anthropology,
biology
,
and the other special sciences. Man is there before
he can be the object of analysis. In investigating other
entities, he must start from himself. Whatever he discovers
is interpreted through the medium of his own understanding
and experience and is reported in terms that are at least
in part the product of that understanding and experience.
Whatever is said about man, either by the special
sciences or by theology, it is not enough. It does not,
and cannot, include man’s primordial understanding of his
own ontological rootedness: 1 ^ "’Being’ cannot be derived
from higher concepts by definition nor can it be presented
through lower ones." 1 ? The under standing which man "has" as
a result of tradition, study, etc., may coincide with this
I^Heidegger speaks of this as the "vague average under-
standing of Being" ( Being and Time
, p. 25 /b7) . I think of
it as one's unformulated awareness of his historical related-
ness--both personal and public. I am actual only as a total-
ity (my life has significance only as a totality) but my
totality can be understood only ontologically
.
Ontically
viewed, I am an entity of such and such dimensions, with a
set of constantly changing characteristics, exhibiting cer-
tain behavior patterns. Ontologically I am a whole and as
long as I exist, "both the ’ends' /of my life/ an(^ their
'between' are ..." ( Ibid . , p. '426 .
Introducing "Phenomenology and Existentialism" (William
Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, ed.
,
Philosophy in the Twentieth
Century
,
Vol. 3 /New York: Randon House, 1962/, p. 1 61 )
,
Barrett writes: "The possibility that there can be meaning
at all is grounded on the fact of temporality— on the fact
that man is a being who can bind together past, present,
and future 1 "
^Being and Time
, p. 23 (4).
10
primordial understanding, since much of that which has been
incorporated into the tradition is the result of historical
man's attempt to make explicit his primordial understanding.
The difficulty, however, as Heidegger sees it, is that all
such explication involves dissimulation as well as revela-
tion. When historical man makes assertions he may uncover
or reveal something of his understanding, but in the process
of interpreting that understanding and of putting that inter-
pretation into statement, he will undoubtedly also conceal
something of the original understanding. It is for this
reason that one cannot wholly accept that which has come
down through tradition in the form of assertion, but must
attempt to make the assertion transparent so that it will
yield up something of the experience which produced it. If
man fails to make this attempt and simply passes on down that
which was passed to him, he acts in a way that serves to
further conceal that which the assertions were attempts to
reveal.
Dasein "knows" Being through uncovering it in himself.
He is unique in being the only entity for which the question
of Being matters--the only entity who questions his exist-
ence and its meaning. He acquaints himself with Being in
other areas of that world which he first discovers in him-
self. Before he can know anything about his world he must
first understand the possibility of such knowing, through
himself. Ontic truth is, therefore, preceded by and
dependent on ontological or even pre-ontological understand-
ing of Self as sole possibility for revelation of truth.
"Dasein is as an understanding potentiality-f or-Being
.
" 1
8
When man goes on to acquaint himself with Being in other
entities, he is simply becoming aware of that which has been
there all along but which has been concealed by his own lack
of understanding (loss of Self ). 1 9 His becoming aware is
the emergence (and here emergence means becoming apparent to
thought) of that which, as presence, already
_is but is not
manifest to thought. The power of emergence is "the over-
powering presence that is not yet mastered /bewaltigt_7 in
thought, wherein that which is present manifests itself as
an essent." 20 The more transparent he becomes to himself,
the more will he master in thought.
Becoming transparent to oneself is difficult, however,
because it involves grasping one's existence as a whole,
even though there is part of that existence which is not yet
1 ^Being and Time
, p. 274 (231).
^Dasein has a primordial understanding of its possi-
bilities for Being, but this understanding is accompanied
by a state of mind which conceals Dasein from himself, and
surrenders him to his everydayness. Dasein can reclaim him-
self through a state of mind which admits the potentiality-
for-Being. "And because Dasein is in each case essentially
its own possibility, it can
,
in its very Being, 'choose'
itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win
itself; or only 'seem' to do so. But only in so far as it
is essentially something which can be authentic
. . .
can
it have lost itself and not yet won itself . " [Being and
Time, p. 68
^ Introduction to Metaphysics
, p. 61 .
12
actual--the future. That which is not yet actual belongs to
Dasein as much as does that which is actual. That which is
as potential is limited by death and so death becomes part
of Casein’s existence as a whole. 21
As long as Dasein i
s
as an entity, it has never reached
its ’wholeness'. But if it gains such 'wholeness', this
gain becomes the utter loss of Being-in-the-world . 22
Death "completes" Dasein but at the same time extinguishes
him. Temporality may thus be seen as a primordial element
in the definition of Dasein.
Primordial temporality is recognized only in authentic
existing. In everydayness
,
time is seen as a divisive fac-
tor. We divide our time into units and, in effect, "spend"
these units on things which have successfully competed with
each other for them.
He who is irresolute understands himself in terms of
those very closest events and be-fallings which he
21 As I sit here writing I do not know whether I shall
live to be ninety or even to finish the sentence. I do know
that death is the determining factor--that death is the outer
limit of myself as possibility but as such is part of my life
as a whole.
Prom Chinese philosopher Chuang Tzu
,
we hear: "The sun
at noon is the sun declining, the creature born is the
creature dying." (Paradox HS 4, Chuang Tzu . 33rd Chap.,
quoted in Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy
,
Vol. I ^/London: Allen and Unwin, 1937/, p. 196.)
And from T. S. Eliot:
"Or say that the end precedes the beginning,
And the end and the beginning were always there
Before the beginning and after the end.
And all is always now. ..." ("Burnt Norton",
op. clt
. , p . 7 .
)
Ageing and Time
,
p. 280 (236).
13
encounters
. . . and which thrust themselves upon himin varying ways. Busily losing himself in the oblent
of his concern, he loses his time in it too. Hencehis characteristic way of talking— 'I have no time'. 23
In the mood of irresoluteness man lets himself go this way
and that, being little more than reactor to the myriad in-
fluences which impinge upon him. He divides up his time and
loses both his time and himself without understanding where
either have gone. We are never free of moods but we are
free to replace one mood with another and the mood of reso-
luteness is characterized by a taking hold of oneself, by
establishing resistance to the tyranny of external influ-
ences. 2 ^ This taking hold of oneself is necessary if we
are to live authentically.
Authentic existence
. .
. ,
in its resoluteness, never
loses time and 'always has time'. For the temporality
of resoluteness has, with relation to its Present, the
character of a moment of vision
. . . .
One's existence
in the moment of vision temporalizes itself as some-
thing that has been stretched along in a way which is
fatefully whole in the sense of the authentic histor-
ical constancy of the Self. This kind of temporal
existence has its time for what the Situation demands
of it, and has it 'constantly'. 2 -}
In resoluteness Dasein sees the extent of his lostness
in everydayness. He faces the certainty of his death and
23Being and Time
, p. 463 (410).
24It seems to me that we need to consider this word
"resoluteness". It shares some of the meaning of will power
but does not have the same implication of being involved as
an implement for the enforcement of values. It is, rather,
a guardian of openness. Whereas Dasein acts in willing, he
is in being resolute.
25Ibid.
14
holds himself open toward it and toward the possibilities of
his finite existence. As certain as we are that death is
ours, we are equally uncertain as to when it will occur. It
is at once inescapably certain, yet indefinite. The facing
and accepting of death exposes all self deception and
"fleeing from"
.
Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to
face with our individualized potentiality-f or-Being
,
there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility. °In
it Dasein becomes free from the entertaining 'inci-
dentals' with which busy curiosity keeps providing it-
self--pr imarily from the events of the world. 26
It is the unification of time which Heidegger refers to
as man's transcendence, but here the word "transcendence"
takes on a very different meaning from that given it by
Christianity. Heidegger's Dasein looks backwards and re-
members; he looks forward and anticipates; he looks outward
at the things of his world, and inward at the looking Self. 27
26Ibld
.
,
p. 358 (310).
27 m To be conscious is not to be in time
But only in time can the moment in the rose-garden,
Be remembered; involved with past and future.
Only through time time is conquered." (T. S. Eliot,
"Burnt Norton", op. cit
.
,
p. 5.)
The past lives in the present in memory but the authen-
tic experience of the present (which assumes memorable qual-
ity as it passes into pastness) is out of time. It is con-
sciousness without being consciousness of; it is understand-
ing that does not take an object but simply enjoys itself;
it is wonder in the eyes of a child. It is, perhaps, aware-
ness of following a Way that others have followed, of par-
ticipating in the dialogue of an I-Thou relationship, of
belonging essentially to "the stillpoint of the turning
world"
.
15
All experience filters through him as individual. That
which he understands of history is determined in part by his
past—that with which he came into the world as well as that
which he has done and been--and in part by his future—that
which he chooses to do or be, limited or defined by what he
can be. 28 Transcendence in this sense is man transcending
time and space to bring everything into focus in the present
—man transcending his finitude by relating to past and
future in the role of voice in the conversation of histor-
ical man.
In the fundamental ontology of Heidegger, man seeks
Being, not in introspective withdrawal from others or from
the world, but in involvement with all of that with which
he is concerned in his everyday life.^9
It is particularly important that Dasein should not be
interpreted with the differentiated character ^Diff erenz7
of some definite way of existing, but that it should be
uncovered ^uj: gedeckt7 in the undifferentiated char-
acter which it has proximally and for the most part. 30
28what he can be, of course, is defined not only by his
ability, energy, resolve, etc., but by his death.
29iJot unlike the Mahayana Buddhist, or the Zen Buddhist,
he finds enlightenment in the midst of involvement— the
authentic and inauthentic are one, even as are nirvana (the
bliss of the ultimate mystery), and samsara (involvement in
the round of struggle and suffering): "So long_as nirvana
is looked upon as something different from samsara, the most
elementary error about existence still has to be overcome.
These two ideas mirror contrary attitudes of the semicon-
scious individual toward himself and the outer sphere in
which he lives; ..." (See Heinrich Zimmer, Philosophies
of India
,
Joseph Campbell, ed., _/New York: Meridian Books,
Inc
.
,
1 95^7? p. 481.)
30Being and Time
, p. 69 (43)
.
16
The pre
-onto logical understanding of Being which belongs to
Dasein "comes alive" and is formulated explicitly through
concernful involvement with entities of the everyday envir-
onmental it i s in such involvement with others that Dasein
becomes transparent to himself, and if he fails in becoming
transparent, his problem is as much rooted in "lack of
51 Heidegger uses the term "ready-to-hand" in referring
to the relationship of concernful involvement with entitiesin the environment. "The ready-to-hand is always understood
in terms^of^a totality of involvements." (Being and Time,
p. 191 /150/.) When I first read Being and Time my interest
was aroused by Heidegger's differentiation between the ready-
to-hand and the pre sent-at-hand because it enabled me to
explicate a particular relationship of which I had long been
vaguely aware but to which I had given little thought. For
years I have daily grasped the cellar stairway railing, in
order to balance on the stairs, but each time I grasp it”Tor
this reason, I am also aware of the railing itself and the
character it has acquired in a hundred years of use. I have
felt this railing day after day, and "know" it in a concern-
ful way through my use of it. I could easily distinguish it
from another railing and would be immediately aware of the
change, should it be replaced, but were I to try to describe
it in terms of the kind of wood, the dimensions of the rail,
etc., my attempt would serve only to conceal its ready-to-
hand character and would be reducing it to its present-at-
hand character. The more we use such things as the railing,
the more primordial does our relationship to them become,
and the more do they reveal themselves to us. But the world
is disclosed to us before we are consciously aware of that
disclosure. I was aware, in my being-ness, of the feel of
the rail before I gained explicit awareness of my relation-
ship to it (an awareness which in this case didn't come until
my reading of Being and T ime
,
some three or four years after
my initial use of the railing)
.
The disclosedness had to be
there in order for me to become explicitly aware of it.
Dasein also has the character of ready-to-handness in
his involvement with others, but Dasein alone of the ready-
to-hand goes beyond this ready-to-handness to the point of
being able to understand and interpret and disclose, with
the help of language.
17
acquaintance with the world" as in "’egocentric 1 self-
deceptions" . ^2 Yet that very involvement— even the search
f
he makes in attempting to know Being by studying "beings"-^
--conceals him from himself: "... the entity which in
every case we ourselves are, is onto logic ally that which is
farthest
.
"34- Man searches for and finds his explanations in
otherness, while that which should be closest to him—the
Self--is the least understood.
Although man is always related to Being, he spends most
of his time and effort relating to particular manifestations
of it--he spends most of his time in the world of everyday-
ness. Even when he approaches ultimate questions he draws
from the materials of his everyday world, as indeed he must.
His encounters with Being may actually be looked upon as
32geing and Time
,
p. 1 87 (146).
33"Common sense", which is the label that everyday
thinking gives itself, insists on the "factual" and defines
factuality in terms of entities in their present-at-hand
character. Part of its reason for so doing is the belief
that only the factual is reliable and therefore only that
yielded by the factual is sufficiently dependable to warrant
serving as a basis for conclusions.
"Common sense concerns itself, whether ’theoretically'
or 'practically', only with entities which can be surveyed
at a glance circumspectively . What is distinctive in common
sense is that it has in view only the experiencing of 'factual'
entities, in order that it may be able to rid itself of an
understanding of Being. It fails to recognize that entities
can be experienced 'factually' only when Being is already
understood, even if it has not been conceptualized." ( Ibid .
,
p. 363 23157-)
34-Ibia.
,
p. 359 (31 1 ).
18
disturbing encounters with the paradoxical and so be pushed
aside and neglected because his everyday relations appear so
much more concrete and objective. 35 in the judgment of his
"they" self, the experience itself is suspect.
The fact that we may fail to pursue the paradoxical
does not thereby eliminate it. It simply makes it the more
hidden from us. We push it aside and forget it but in so
doing, put the forgotten in a realm of its own. The mys-
terious thus retreats into hiddenness. The further we go,
depending solely on the resources of our everydayness, the
more we alienate ourselves from Being. The more we succeed
in leading full, active, and positive everyday lives, the
more successfully do we conceal Being. Yet it is through
this everyday life, through ourselves in our everydayness,
that we approach the understanding of what we are in our
being, even though Being is so well concealed in our every-
dayness that it has to be "wrested" from it.
The self of everyday Dasein is the they-self /das
Man-selbst7, which we distinguish from the authentic
Self --that is, from the Self which has been taken hold
of in its own way jfeigens ergriffene£?• As they-self,
the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the
"they", and must first find itself. ... If Dasein is
familiar with itself as they-self, this means at the
same time that the "they" itself prescribes
. .
.
/the_7
way of interpreting the world
. .
."36
35Everyday man publishes the results of his concrete
research but hides his poetry in his bureau drawer.
36Being and Time
, p. 1 67 (129).
19
We function in everydayness with regard to our social,
economic, and political concerns and do that which we do for
the sake of the "they"--which is not only others, but the
they in ourselves, our own public character. It is the
"they' 1 which dictates the value or significance of what we
do in our everydayness. For the most part, Dasein functions
in his "they" character. When a disclosure of his authentic
Self takes place, it is accomplished by a sort of clearing-
away of the things which have made the "they"-self and its
activities seem of primary importance and significance.
Being must be found in everydayness, yet in that everyday-
ness man loses himself and misses Being. As long as we live
our "they" life in an other-centered way (and here "other"
refers as well to the "they"-self in me), without being
aware that we are doing so, then we are covering up and
missing our authentic Self and world. When the "they"
world becomes— instead of a consuming end in itself and
thereby an obstacle to under standing--the path to authentic
Selfhood and one's own world, then its value as the means
to understanding can be seen. Authenticity is not distinct
from
,
but a modification _of
,
everydayness.
The inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any
'less' Being or any ’lower' degree of Being. Rather
it is the case that even in its fullest concretion
Dasein can be characterized by inauthent icity--when
busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for
enjoyment . 37
37 ibid
.
,
p. 68 (43).
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If Dasein in his "they" character sees himself leading
a full and genuine life, he may be fooling himself and
through this self-deception, lulling himself into a state
of tranquillity which is at once comforting and alienating
--comforting in giving false assurance that everything is
understood, but alienating in that it hides one’s ownmost
pot entiality-f or-Be ing (or in that it keeps one from one’s
Self)
.
Through the self-certainty and decidedness of the "they",
it gets spread abroad increasingly that there is no
need of authentic understanding or the state-of-mind
that goes with it. The supposition of the "they" that
one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine ’life',
brings Dasein a tranquillity
,
for which everything is
'in the best of order ’ and all doors are open. Falling
Being-in-the-world
,
which tempts itself, is at the same
time tranquillizing _^beruhigend7.^°
This tranquillizing has the effect of driving one into
activity because one thinks he knows what the solutions are
and has only to implement them.
Dasein plunges out of itself into itself, into the
groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everyday-
ness. But this plunge remains hidden from Dasein by
the way things have been publicly interpreted, so
much so, indeed, that it gets interpreted as a way of
’ascending’ and 'living concretely '. 39
Thus the tranquillizing effect of public approval
serves to alienate Dasein from himself. If this alienation
38Ibid
.
,
p. 222 (177). Heidegger sees this as a form
of tranquillizing which, in essence, is more of a delusive
lulling because it "does not seduce one into stagnation and
inactivity, but drives one into uninhibited 'hustle'
^Betr iebs/.
"
39 ibid
.
,
p. 223 (178).
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is felt, it may lead merely into exaggerated self analysis
and a consequent further concealing of Self, but there is
also the possibility that it may produce the anxiety which
leads to the penetration of the mysterious.
Although the ’’they" character is that in which we all
dwell for the most part, the individual tends to think of
others as "they", without including himself: "They said
this
. . .
They did that
. .
." When everyday Dasein is
asked "Who?" and answers, "They", he is really answering,
"Nobody ". 40 We tend to think of the way in which "they"
live, without including ourselves, while actually this
everyday averageness is the way in which we all live and
in which we conceal the authentic Self.
In our everyday life, functioning in our "they" role,
we do not need (or at least recognize our need of) that
which Paul Tillich called "the courage to be". We drift
along in the false security of the "they"-world ’ s assur-
ances until we confront the fact that "they" cannot protect
us from our unique destiny--our own death. We may live our
entire lives lost in "they"-ness and insulated against
thoughts of death.
Dying, which is essentially mine in such a way that no
one can be my representative, is perverted into an
event of public occurrence which the "they" encounters.
In the way of talking which we have characterized,
death is spoken of as a 'case’ which is constantly
occurring. Death gets passed off as always something
4oIbid
.
,
pp. 164-5 (127).
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actual
;
its character as a possibility gets concealed,
... By such ambiguity, Dasein puts itself in the posi-tion of losing itself in the "they" as regards a dis-
tinctive potentiality-f or-Being which belongs to
Dasein’ s ownmost Self. The "they" gives its approval,
and aggravates the temptation to coyer up from oneself
one's ownmost Being-towards-death. 4
1
"They" do not want to permit Dasein to take his death
to himself and face it. Up to the very end, they are insist-
ing upon the evasive concealment of such words as "You’ll be
better soon," or "Of course you're going to get well." 42
Thus Dasein flees from death. This evasive fleeing from
one's own possibilities, Heidegger calls "falling". It is
characteristic of everydayness. It does not mean that death
ceases to be an issue but rather that it becomes an issue in
a deficient mode-through calculated indifference or deceit.
If it becomes the dominant mode of our existence we may be
quite unprepared for death and quite unprepared to accept
the fact that "they" cannot really help us.^ If we have so
4l Ibld
.
,
p. 297 (253)
.
4-2These words may be spoken from the indifference of
everydayness or they may be expressive of a kind of solici-
tude which wants to "take over" --to relieve the other of his
problems, thus dominating and making him dependent. This
kind of solicitude robs the other of himself while deceiving
him into believing that all is well, and should be carefully
distinguished from the care that Dasein exhibits in his
authentic relations with others. Authentic caring tries to
help the other become aware of himself and by so doing to
free him for the assumption of his own responsibility and
the realization of his own potential. (See Ibid .
,
pp. 158-9
/T227.)
43i am reminded of being present at the death of a
fifty-year-old maiden aunt. Her final battle with angina
pectoris lasted three days, and by the third day she began
to realize that she would probably die. It seemed to be
23
lived, we have dwelt for the most part in a sort of 'untruth ' 1
and have been freed from this untruth only when it is too
late
.
But at any time freedom involves anxiety and uncertainty
and man in his everydayness seeks an existence free from
such anxiety and uncertainty. He cannot face the thought of
not being and so accepts answers— such as personal immor-
tality in the Christian sense—which offer relief from both
death and uncertainty. In so doing, he is deceiving himself
with false assurances which permit him to pursue his life of
tranquillity. But he does not wholly rid himself of doubt
and does bury more deeply the possibility of understanding.
The anxiety of freedom is the condition of understanding.
Man looks for and finds many aids in the process of
insulating himself against the contemplation of not being.
He can involve himself in useful work which needs no Justi-
fication but which reduces the frequency of those moments of
silence in which the emptiness of non-being confronts him.
His life takes on importance through the service he renders
or the contributions he makes to society. But the more
important he considers the work, the greater is its power
entirely unexpected and something to be resisted frantically.
With each seizure, she would grasp anybody near and cling to
them as if she believed that they might protect her. In
between seizures she would plead with the doctor, with God,
and with us, as if, God and the doctor failing, we would
surely help. The words, "No, no!" punctuated her final in-
take of breath, and she died with the doctor's coat lapels
gripped in her fingers.
24
to deceive and conceal.^ Convinced of the value of what he
is doing and of what he has to offer the world, he may work
feverishly to uncover new scientific truths, or improve his
teaching skills, or write more adequate sermons, and in so
doing lose himself. If in the midst of this activity, how-
ever, he pauses occasionally to wonder about the importance
of what he is doing, he is experiencing the uneasiness of
open-ness, which Heidegger refers to as "wanting to have a
conscience" . ^5 The uneasiness is the call of conscience--
the call of authentic Selfhood to the self lost in everyday-
ness— and is heard only when conscience speaks more clearly
than the myriad voices of the "they"—including the "they"-
self--to which we are accustomed to listening and which may
be applauding our work.
Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode
of keeping silent
. ...
Yet what the call discloses is unequivocal, even
though it may undergo a different interpretation in
the individual Dasein in accordance with its own
^When I am working concentratedly on a project which
I consider worthwhile, I don’t question the value of the
time spent. But when I sit three or four hours in front of
a television set, without enjoying or even really being
aware of what I am watching, I become most uncomfortable.
I may continue to sit and watch, even as I berate myself for
doing so, but in this situation—which appears to be an
obvious waste of time--I am more likely to experience the
kind of uneasiness which leads to a breakthrough to Self
than I am when I am busy with things which my "they" self
considers important or necessary.
4~5Being and Time
, p. 334 ( 288 ). "Openness" in this
context means to be open to one’s own possibilities.
25
possibilities of understanding
***•••••••
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s^on s Dasein's Self from its lostnessm the they
Because the call of conscience is to the "they"
-self
,
Dasein may interpret it in terms of the experience of his
"they” -self ,47 and if he does, he may pursue that which is
considered important, respectable, valuable, etc., by the
public standards which he, in his "they" character, has
helped to establish. If he does, he will still be covering
up, albeit in a different way, his own possibilities.
He may also hide these possibilities by interpreting
his initial break-through into understanding in such a way
as to result in willing unreal or extravagant possibilities.
Heidegger speaks of this as projecting a wish-world
.
46Ibld
.
,
pp. 318-9 (273-4).
47The conscience issues nothing in the way of specific
moral or ethical im junctions. Whenever it is believed to be
doing so, i.e., when It is believed to making value judg-
ments about our activities or our behavior, it is simply
that we are adding to the basic call a content which does
not belong to it but belongs to our religious or ethical
code. When we do this we are actually refusing to hear the
call
.
^The concept of the wish-world may need some clarifi-
cation although it is one with which we are all familiar.
It is that world in which we see possibilities just beyond
where we now stand. It is the world of the greener grass,
the better tomorrow, that blinds us to the possibilities of
the here and now (which, in Heidegger, includes
,
as we have
already seen, the yesterday and the tomorrow) . It is the
never-realized world--the world in which we go in search of
possibilities which seem to offer greater promise. We all
venture into the wish-world now and then, but if we attempt
to dwell there, we reap not the expected harvest of delights,
26
Man loses himself in such projecting by losing the world
which is his own and seeking one which is not available to
him. Instead of being able to work out his own possibilities
in the world which is his, he exhibits constant dissatis-
faction with that which is available to him and bestows
reality on his wish world. Again this results in covering
up his own possibilities and, further, permits him to be
dominated by his willing of unreal possibilities.
If one does, however, experience the uneasiness of open-
ness in a receptive posture, the call of conscience may come
as a call away from excessive activity and to the Self. In
this call to Self, we become aware of possibilities uniquely
ours. ^9 As we have already seen, we may turn away from the
call because it disturbs our tranquillity, but we do have a
choice and herein lies our freedom. We are free to turn
away, back to the security of our everydayness
,
or to make
ourselves accessible to Being.
but one of increasing dissatisfaction with the reality of
our actual existence.
In the Tao Te Ching (Verse I), there is reference to a
barrier of "longing 11 which is not unlike the unreal wishing
of the wish-world. The Taoist speaks of enlightenment
residing as potential in all men but waiting upon "the eyes
unclouded by longing". (See Tao Te Ohing , R. B. Blakney, tr . ,
^/New York: New American Library , 1 955/, p . 53.)
“^Heidegger does not see this as a one-way permanent
enlightenment . Everyday man does not suddenly become aware
and then remain that way, impervious to the assaults of his
everyday world. Quite to the contrary, he is constantly
slipping back into his "they" -world character, and the
"moments of vision", as Heidegger refers to them, may be
rare indeed.
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Let us think Being in its original sense as presence.
Man is neither casually nor exceptionally confronted
by Being. Being becomes evident and lasts only so
long as by virtue of its claim it draws near to/concerns ( an-geht)7 Man. For it is man alone who
has made himself accessible to Being, who permits
Being to approach him with its presence. 50
Making ourselves accessible to Being does not necessi-
tate a radical change in the nature of the activity of our
everyday lives but it does involve a change of attitude a
change of mood. It is the "openness to mystery" which
renders us sensitive to the meaning of what we do in our
everyday lives. Both domination _by our everydayness and
rejection _of it stand in the way of such openness, while
living our ordinary lives in the mood of resoluteness opens
us to the possibilities of our own situation. We may go on
doing the same things we have been doing, but if we do what-
ever we do in such a way as to keep ourselves open to Being, 51
then we bestow meaning on the most ordinary task--we do
whatever we do with a kind of joy. 52
5 (5]V'Iartin Heidegger, Essays in Metaphysics: Identity and
Difference
,
tr. Kurt F. Leidecker ("New York: Philosophical
Library, Inc., i 960 ), p. 22. Man and Being belong together
essentially but Being is evident to man only when man cares
about what he is doing--when it matters— and by caring
becomes open.
51 By caring and by having time "for what the Situation
demands". ( Being and Time , p. 463 /3lo7. See also p. 13
supra
.
)
52As Oamus has said, "One must imagine Sisyphus happy."
(Albert Camus, "The Myth of Sisyphus", Walter Kaufman, ed.,
Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre /FTew York: Meridian
Books, Inc., 1956/, p. 315.)
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In the state of Sorge Dasein grasps his own reality
as projection of the world horizon and, at the same
time,
. as radical finitude. The Dasein who manages,
in this sense, to care realizes his responsibility
as the unique source of meaning in the world and
realizes, in the same instant, his own nothingness
as finite being. 53
Our everydayness, instead of being a barrier to self real-
ization, becomes the very path to Self and Being. Man looks
beyond his everyday world and his finite existence and sees
Nothing. He is forced back upon his own inwardness and
finds Being and himself. It is in the act of giving thanks
for the revelation of Being that speech is born. Man "dedi-
cates the Da-sein he has won for himself to the preservation
of the dignity of Being. "5^ Dasein' s acceptance of his own
non-being—his finitude— has made it possible for him to
conceive of the possibility of the non-being of the things-
that-are. When all that is is set against this background
of non-being--of Nothingness--he sees the importance of his
own role as bestower of meaning because it is only by
virtue of this meaning that the entities of the world step
forward out of the darkness to become part of the world of
man. Thus does man's non-existence become the very ground
of his existence and the source of meaning in that
exi st ence .
53Thomas Langan, op . cit .
, p. 28.
5^"What is Metaphysics?" Werner Brock, op . cit . ,
p. 359.
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Death, as the coffer of the Nothing, protects for manthe realization of Being in itself /"Der Tod biret
a!s der Schrein Aes Nichts das We send'e' des Selns in
sich^y
.
'
d'd
55Martin Heidegger, Vortrage und Aufsatze (Pfullingen:
Verlag Gunther Neske, 1 954)
, p . 1 77 . Cited in Thomas
Langan, op, cit
.
,
p. 121.
CHAPTER III
BEING AND NOTHING
CHAPTER III
BEING AND NOTHING
How did it come about that beings take precedence
everywhere and lay claim to every "is" while that
which is not a being is understood as Nothing,
though it is Being itself, and remains forgotten?
How did it come about that with Being It really is
nothing, and that the Nothing really is not?56
Through man's confrontation with death (nothingness)
he begins to see the relationship between Being and the
Nothing and realizes that he--and he only so long as he
lives— is the very condition for the possibility of there
being anything at all.
Only as long as Dasein i_s (that is, only as long as
an understanding of Being is ontically possible)
,
T is there' Being. 57
5%artin Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of
Metaphysics", Walter Kaufman, ed., op. cit
.
,
p. 221.
In the teachings of Hsi Yun, a Ch'an Buddhist master of
the 9 th century, we read: "To say that the real Dharmakaya
/roughly, "essence// of the Buddha is like the void means
that it actually is void and that the void is in fact the
Dharmakaya.
. . .
The void and the Dharmakaya do not differ
from each other, neither do sentient beings and Buddhas, the
phenomenal world and Nirvana, or delusion and Bodhi /enlight
enment/. Ordinary people look outwards, while followers of
the Way look into their own minds, but the real Dharma is to
forget both the external and the internal. The former is
easy enough, the latter very difficult. Men are afraid to
forget their own minds, fearing to fall through the void
with nothing to which they can cling. They do not know that
the void is not really void but the real realm of the Dharma
(E. A. Burtt
,
ed.
,
The Teachings of the Compassionate Buddha
/New York: New American Library, 1 9 55/ , p . 1 99 .
57]3elng and Time
, p. 255 ( 212).
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Being is
,
and dwells in the world, only as long as, and
when, there is a place for it to dwell. That place is man
speaking. Heidegger challenges the traditional Christian
view of Being as that which is prior to and independent of
entities when he says:
Being never essentializes itself without Seienden,
and Seienden cannot be without Being /das Sein nie
west ohne das Seiende, dass niemals ein Seiendes ist
ohne das Sein/.bb
It is to the what-is ( Seienden ) that man relates in his
everyday life and he relates to the what-is in its particu-
lar manifestations, as things that are
.
He doesn’t seek the
totality to which these manifestations belong, either because
he has a religious answer which satisfies him, or because to
do so is to trespass into an area outside of that which the
rationalism of the tradition would define as the realm of
"responsible thought". 59
As long as life is full and satisfying there seems to
be no need to press beyond the particular manifestations of
Being to which we relate in our everyday existence. It is
only when the meaning of that everyday existence is called
58"What is Metaphysics?" Quoted in Thomas Langan
,
op
.
cit
.
,
p. 97. I have chosen to use this quotation of
Heidegger from a secondary source because the translation
better suits the thought of Heidegger than does the trans-
lation of R. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick which appears in
Werner Brock's Existence and Being (p. 354-). Hull and Crick
have translated the above parenthetic inclusion of German by:
"Being may be without what-is, but never what-is without Being."
^^This definition is given by Laszlo Vers6nyi in his
Heidegger, Being and Truth (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1965)
,
p. 175. See commentary on this work, p. 78 infra .
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into question that we experience uneasiness. If our every-
day life does not provide us with a serene sense of being
at home in the world, of being at home in our situation, we
may begin to question: "What is it all about? Is there any
meaning to my existence? Why am I here?" "Why is there any-
thing at all rather than Nothing?" The farther we press on
in search, the more uneasy we become^0 because the familiar
things of our world seem to lose their concreteness, their
particularity. We even begin to have doubts about our own
personal identity. All that is seems to merge into a vast
amorphous totality which is at once everything and nothing.
Nothingness ... is the radical nullification of the
totality of beings /das Seiende7 . Since, as no-thing,
it cannot become an object for the intellect, it mani-
fests itself in such affective states as total ennui or
anguish in which the totality of concrete being, in-
cluding the Self, begins to float in insubstantial un-
reality, and we are repelled with a shock from the
Nothingness which faces us as the imminent possibility
which resides in the very heart of human being ^asein/
and in which our being is contained. 61
6°Heidegger uses the word "dread" to describe this un-
easiness because "dread" seems to fit that horror which has
no known object. Our dread is uf or about
,
but of or about
what, we never know, and it is this unknowing that intensi-
fies the dread itself and makes it the mood in which man en-
counters Nothing. "We ourselves confirm that dread reveals
Nothing--when we have gotten over our dread. In the lucid
vision which supervenes while yet the experience is fresh in
our memory we must needs say that what we were afraid of was
'actually 1 /elgentlich : also 'authentic^? Nothing. And in-
deed Nothing itself, Nothing as such, was there." ("What is
Metaphysics?" Werner Brock, op . cit .
,
pp. 336-7.)
Jean T. Wilde and William Kimmel, tr. and ed., The
Search for Being (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1 §6 1 )
,
pp . 50T-^~. This appears in a footnote appended to an excerpt
from "On the. Essence of the Ground" but is, I believe, based
on Heidegger's portrait of the Nothing in "What is
Metaphysics?"
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The totality of what-ls is not a collection of things and it
is only as the thing character of everything vanishes that
we experience this blending or melting which yields the
totality of Being--the Nothing. ^ The experience is made
possible by man's Dasein character enabling him to relate to
what-ls by being transcendent in the sense of belonging
essentially to the Nothing. ^3 But as the
_is character of all
that is familiar escapes, and Dasein is engulfed by the is-
not, he is gripped by undefined panic. "There is nothing to
hold on to." If he stands fast in his panic, however, he
will be rewarded with an easing of the terror and an awaken-
ing of wonder.
^This is Heidegger’s moment of vision--the moment in
which we break through to that dark background against which
we see our own potentiality-f or-Being. This limited share
of potential is that which Whitehead refers to as the "real"
potential and distinguishes from the "general" potential
which is the sum of all such possibilities. (See Alfred
North Whitehead, "Process and Reality", Chap. II, Section II,
Part III: The Categories of Explanation (iv), (v), (vi), and
(vii), F. S. C. Northrop and Mason W. Gross, ed., Alfred
North Whitehead, an Anthology ^/New York: The Macmillan
Company
, 196_1_/, pp. 584 ff, especially p. 590.
63if my essence is existence and my existence is an
amorphous unity of a past which is gone, a future which
has not yet come, and a present which never i_s, then I
belong essentially to the Nothing. When tradition speaks
of a subject "I" it is regarding man ontically rather than
ontologically~-it is regarding him as something present-at-
hand which maintains a continuing identity. When man speaks
of himself, he most often speaks the "I" from his every-
dayness. The more truly he is hidden, from himself, the more
loudly does he proclaim the "I".
^"What is Metaphysics?" Werner Brock, op. cit .
,
p. 336.
.
r
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The clear courage for essential dread guarantees that
most mysterious of all possibilities: the experience
of Being. For hard by essential dread,
.in the terror
of the abyss, there dwells awe /Scheu7
.
65
Heidegger sees the ancient Greek figure of Oedipus
exemplifying this "clear courage for essential dread". ^
The ancients stood in awe of the paradoxical nature of that
which appeared both as unity and diversity. They embodied
it in their gods, and in their poetry. It was the only pos
sible expression of that mystery which, when approached too
closely, appeared to be the "very abyss of meaninglessness".
The mortal who has tasted in anguish the great and
bitter fruit of his nothingness respects the unnamed
and guards the unknown. He does this by refusing to
turn night falsely into day, i.e., by respecting
0
mystery . °
<
Whereas the ancients respected mystery, there have been
many of us at the other end of the spectrum who have "in
sheer timidity, shut our ears to the soundless voice which
6 5lbid
.
,
p. 355.
^See An Introduction to Metaphysics
, pp. 106-7. As
Oedipus pressed on in his search for the murderer of his
father, he was more and more possessed by a vague horror of
what he would find, but his passion for truth (for the dis-
closure of Being) drove him on. After the disclosure of
that to which his search had led, he put out his eyes as if
to extinguish the light by which Being stood revealed, only
to discover, later in his life, that even in his blindness
Being stood illuminated and undisclosed before him.
"King Oedipus has one
Eye too many perhaps." (Heidegger quoting
Holderlin, Werner Brock, op . cit .
, p. 289.)
67Thomas Langan, op . cit .
, p. 126, paraphrasing
Heidegger, Vortrage und Aufsatz , p. 150.
•<
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attunes us to the horror of the abyss." 68 In between the
two extremes are those for whom the apparent conflict of
differences has to be re solved--they can't live with un-
certainty. It requires too much courage to look into the
abyss and to listen for the silence that strikes terror to
our hearts. But it is in this silence that we experience
"that unquestionable, unanalyzable
,
mute grasp of the Being
of something which is present as the very atmosphere in
which any grasp of any kind of thing takes place--a notion
of Being present . . . " 69
Man' s attempts to deal with the problem of Being have
had their origins in this "mute grasp"
,
but not all men
have accepted it as unanalyzable and great differences
appear in the explicit formulations which follow the aware-
ness. Despite his primordial understanding, man can make
his experiences explicit only through himself as voice, and
the interpretation of his experience will always be shaped
by that which he is. If he has become aware of his own
68
"What is Metaphysics?" Werner Brock, or. cit . ,
p. 354.
69fhomas Langan, op, cit .
,
p. 82, paraphrasing
Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphvsik (Frankfurt
am Main: Verlag Vittorio Klostermann, 1951), pp. 204-5. It
is this mute grasp which Heidegger calls primordial under-
standing--"the understanding which is prior to the formation
of all ideas". (Heidegger, op . cit . , p. 205, quoted by
Langan, op , cit .
,
p. 82.)
7°0ne of the paradoxes of the human scene, which bears
out Heidegger's thesis, is that even those who recognize and
acknowledge the ineffable nature of Being, still try to talk
and write about it.
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possibilities and has reduced the domination of his past, he
will attempt to make his interpretation authentic, i.e,, free
it from the criteria of his "they"-world.
Man's history is a record of attempts to give expres-
sion to the experience of Being, but because of its elusive
nature men have often fallen into the trap of positing more
than is warranted, as is the case in classical ontology and
Christian theology or less than is warranted, as is the
case in modern science.
When Plato went beyond the intelligible ideas to posit
the Good, he seemed to acknowledge the obscure, unintelli-
gible source of the intelligible, but he established it in
a realm of its own and accomplished, at the same time, a
radical devaluation of Being.
But insofar as the ideas constitute being, ousia
IqujzIqJ » the idea_tou agathou Tou «va 6 7 ,
the supreme idea, stands epekeina tes ousias
/lire K£L va_jr^s 7 , beyond being. Thus being
71 In Buddhism, the concept of the Void (Sunyata) is
necessary because any attempt at positive identification of
being would limit it to the phenomenal world--the realm of
samsara. Yet Sunyata is a positive principle in that noth-
ing is possible without it. Despite the fact that the
Buddha cautioned against making positive assertions about
the Void, the development of Buddhist thought led to the
Yogacara doctrine of the Void as repository of universal con-
sciousness; (See Heinrich Zimmer, op. cit
.
, pp. 526 ff.)
and to the Zen doctrine of No-mind (See T
.
D. Suzuki, op
.
cit
.
, pp. 190 ff.). The Buddha was not the only one to issue*-
injunctions against speaking of that which we cannot know
(we might also include Wittgenstein and Suzuki) but men con-
tinue to speak and, I believe with Heidegger, always will,
because questioning is man's way of being, and the attempt
to give meaning to that which he finds in his quest will
compel him to speak.
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itself
,
not as such, but as idea, comes into opposition
to something other, on which it, being, is dependent.
The supreme idea has become the model of the models. 72
In the realm of the intelligible he created a dualism in
which reality and appearance were separated, with appearance
taking on a deficient character. He could not accept, as
could his predecessors, the unity and equality of opposites.
He seemed compelled to establish a hierarchy and bring order
out of the chaos which he saw exemplified in ancient art and
poetry.
It was in the Sophists and in Plato that appearance
was declared to be mere appearance and thus degraded.
At the same time being, as idea, was exalted to a
supra-sensory realm. A chasm, chor ismos [~* p l aju o s- 7,
was created between the merely apparent es sent here
below and real being somewhere on high. In that
chasm Christianity settled down, at the same time
reinterpreting the lower as the created and the
higher as the creator. These refashioned weapons it
turned against antiquity (as paganism) and so dis-
figured it. 73
Christianity took up Plato's concept of the Good but re-
jected his devaluation of Being. In Christianity Being and
the Good shared supremacy but were located in a creative
absolute through whom all that was came to be.
Things are only what they are, if they are, to the
extent that they, as created things ( ens creatum )
,
correspond to an idea preconceived in the intellectus
divinus
,
that is to say, in the mind of God, and thus
conform to the idea . . .74
72aji Introduction to Metaphysics
, pp. 196-7.
73 lbid
.
,
p . 1 06 .
7^Martin Heidegger, M 0n the Essence of Truth", Werner
Brock, op . clt .
,
p. 296.
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As created, the human intellect reflects its correspondence
with the divine intellect by realizing, in its propositions,
.
...
that approximation of thought to thing, which,
in its turn, must also conform to the idea. The pos-
sibility of human knowledge being true (granted that
all that "is'' is "created") has its basis in the fact
that thing and proposition are to an equal extent in
conformity with the idea and thus find themselves con-
forming to one another in the unity of the divine
creative plan. '5
Whereas classical metaphysics had said ex nihilo nihil
fit (from nothing, nothing comes), Christian dogma substi-
tuted ex nihilo fit--ens creatum (out of nothing all is
created ). 76 The "more than was warranted" which Christianity
was guilty of positing was the Creator--God
.
Modern science predicates too little of being when it
makes it simply the common denominator of entities which, as
present-at-hand objects, can be Investigated by the methods
of the special sciences, classified, and certified in their
75ibid
.
"^Heidegger takes this a step further--a step which he
sees as making the old proposition morvs appropriate to the
problem of Being: " ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit fout of
nothing
. . .
all being as such emerges/" . ( "What is
Metaphysics?", quoted by Karl Lowith, ""Heidegger: Problem
and Background of Existentialism", Social Research , Vol. 15,
p. 355.) I have taken the translation of this proposition
from Lowith’ s article rather than from the Werner Brock
work, where the essay appears in its entirety (p. 346),
because I find Lowith' s interpretation of the Latin more
compatible with Heidegger’s tone than the interpretation of
Hull and Crick in the Brock volume: "every being, so far
as it is a being, is made out of nothing". It is the phrase
"made out of" to which I object inasmuch as it implies a
maker and the important . difference between Heidegger’s prop-
osition and the Christian proposition is, of course, in the
way that entities emerge from nothingness. (See p. 11 supra .
)
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classifications through the use of truth as agreement be-
tween statement and object. 7?
We shall not get a genuine knowledge of essences
simply by the syncretistic activity of universal
comparison and classification. Subjecting the mani-
fold to tabulation does not ensure any actual under-
standing of what lies there before us as thus set in
order. If an ordering principle is genuine, it has
its own content as a thing /Sachgehalt_7, which is
never to be found by means of such ordering, but is
already presupposed in it. So if one is to put
various pictures of the world in order, one must
have an explicit idea of the world as such. And if
the ’world' itself is something constitutive for
Dasein, one must have an insight into Casein's basic
structures in order to treat the world-phenomenon
conceptually .78
There must be a coming together in conscious experience of
Being and being (a coming-together which is actually only
a br inging-out-into-the-open of their essential and already
'there' belonging-together) if there is to be an explicit
understanding and a genuine speaking in any sort of invest!-
gation of phenomena. One thing necessary for this coming
together is "keeping aloof from the attitude of representa-
tional thinking". 79
This keeping aloof is a positing in the sense of a leap.
It is a bounding away from and a leaving behind of the
familiar concept of man as the animal rationale , the
rational animal, who nowadays has become the subject
for his objects . 80
77This definition of truth as agreement between judgment
and object is discussed on p. 6l infra .
78Being and Time
,
p. 77 (52).
79Essays in Metaphysics: Identity and Difference , p. 23.
8°Ibid. Heidegger reinterprets the Greek expression
Aoyov evcv , traditionally translated "rational animal",
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Keeping aloof from representational thinking is diffi-
cult, but the measure of both science and philosophy is the
degree to which they can remain open for the speaking of
Being and do so by subjecting their most basic concepts to
continuous and radical examination.
Representational thinking examines entities in their
pre sent-at-hand character and sets them in order according
to an explicit idea of world without adequately exploring
the field which gave rise to that idea of world. As a
product of his tradition, modern Western man is likely to
see himself as a knowing entity at the center of a knowable
world. The degree to which his knowledge reflects the char-
acter of that world is determined by his success in refining
so that it becomes "that living thing whose Being is essent-
ially determined by the potentiality for discourse". This
change rests on Heidegger’s interpretation of A o yes as dis-
course (Rede) instead of reason. (See Being and Time
,
p. 47
/257 .)
William Kimmel,
Being
,
says that for
"Being
in his Introduction to The Search for
Heidegger (as for Marcel and
is
limits of
death and
covery of
the forms
tionship
Jasper s )
:
encountered first in a metaphysical shock at the
reason. . . . Heidegger's dread in the face of
Nothingness /Ts the occasion/ • • • f°r ^i- s_
Being which is . . . outside and beyond reason and
of consciousness but encountered . . . in a rela-
to them." (Jean T. Wilde and William Kimmel, op.
cit
.
, p . 23 .
)
The leap away from man as rational animal is a leap
essential to Zen Buddhism also. "There is a leap, logical
and psychological, in the Buddhist experience. . . . for
when Prajna ^he wisdom that leads to the identification of
Being and Nothing/ functions, one finds oneself all of a
sudden
. .
.
facing Sunyata /the Void./, the emptiness of all
things. This does not take place as the result of reasoning
but when reasoning has been abandoned as futile , and psycho-
logically when the will-power is brought to a finish." (D. T
Suzuki, op. cit .
, pp. 185-6.)
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and ordering his concepts. The important point which he too
often overlooks is that he himself _is the final ordering
principle.^ 1 He is aware, if he is a scientist, that the
instruments he uses for observation and measurement have a
distorting influence on the observed phenomena so that he is
never quite sure of the character of the entity under obser-
vation. He may be less aware of his own role as distorting
influence, but if he is aware of it, then he knows that the
greater is his understanding of himself, the more clearly
will he see his world.
The danger which Heidegger sees in failing to keep
aloof from representational thinking lies in the possibility
of coming to consider it the only way of thinking, and
thereby blocking our access to the primordial relationship
between man and his world. Awareness of the primordial
relationship is buried when entities are regarded solely
in their pr esent-at-hand character.
To forget being and cultivate only the essent—that is
nihilism
To press inquiry into being explicitly to the limits
of nothingness, to draw nothingness into the question
of being--this is the first and only fruitful step
toward a true transcending of nihilism. 02
Any discussion of Being which is cast in terms of the
Nothing will invariably call forth the charge "illogical!"
8lHe may use established categories, etc., but the final
decision as to the appropriate category for a. given entity is
made by him and will be influenced by that which he is.
82An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 203 .
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and the charge is perfectly justified. But unless we accept
logic as the final judge of expressions of experience, the
charge need not concern us.
"Logic" is only one exposition of the nature of think-
ing, and one which, as its name shows, is based on the
experience of Being as attained in Greek thought. The
animus against "logic"
. . .
derives from the knowledge
of that thinking which has its source not in the obser-
vation of the objectivity of what-is, but in the ex-
perience of the truth of Being.
But what if both our concern for the fundamental rules
of thought /logic/ and our fear of nihilism, which
both seem to counsel against speaking of nothing,
should be based on a misunder standing? °4
The pre-Socratics spoke of contradiction as the very
essence of life. Their search was for some unified source
from which this contradiction might spring. ^5 Truth was
83
"What is Metaphysics?" Werner Brock, op , cit .
,
p. 356. Heidegger’s view of the inadequacy of logic is one
he shares with Indian thought. Heinrich Zimmer ( op . cit .
,
p. 25) writes: "Indian philosophy insists that the sphere
of logical thought is far exceeded by that of the mind's
possible experiences of reality. To express and communicate
knowledge gained in moments of grammar-transcending insight,
metaphors must be used, similes and allegories. These are
then not mere embellishments, dispensable accessories, but
the very vehicles of the meaning, which could not be ren-
dered, and could never have been attained, through the
logical formulae of normal verbal thought. Significant
images can comprehend and make manifest with clarity and
pictorial consistency the paradoxical character of the
reality known to the sage: a translogical reality, which,
expressed in the abstract language of normal thought, would
seem inconsistent, self-contradictory
,
or even absolutely
meaningless .
"
84~An Introduction to Metaphysics
,
p. 24.
S^The Hindus and Buddhists also sought this unitary
source of contradiction. The Hindus named it Brahman; the
Buddhists named it Sunyata; they both found nothing other .
The attempt to describe what they found led them into
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that which motivated, their search rather than that which
they articulated as a result.
In order to find something must we not know before-
hand that it is there? Indeed we must! First and
foremost we can only look if we have presupposed the
presence of a thing to be looked for. But here the
thing we are looking for is Nothing. Is there after
all a seeking without pre-supposition, a seeking
complemented by a pure finding?86
Heidegger's attempt to restore the purity of the original
word is an attempt to go back of that which has most import-
antly influenced our tradition to its roots in something
more primal. Thus the nihilating with which he is charged
is not a nihilating in the sense of a repudiation of history,
but is:
. . .
a dismantling, liquidating, putting to one side
the merely historical assertions about the history of
philosophy. Destruction means--to open our ears, to
paradoxical expressions, such as:
"Brahman is the ritual,
Brahman is the offering,
Brahman is he who offers
To the fire that is Brahman." (From the
Bhagavad- Gita
,
IV, 24, tr . Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher
I sherwood /New York: New American Library, 19547* p. 53.)
And (from Suzuki, op . cit .
,
p. 243): "In the case of Ungan
^/Tun-yen T'an-Ch'eng, 7Bl-84j_7, "the sweeping and the sweeper
and the broom are all one, even including the ground which
is being swept."
T. S. Eliot's experience of the still point led him to
express himself with words like these:
"The intersection of the timeless moment
Is England and nowhere. Never and always."
(From "Little Gidding"
,
op . cit
.
, p. 32.)
86"What is Metaphysics?" Werner Brock, op . cit .
,
p. 332.
.
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make our selves free for what speaks to us in tradition
as the Being of being. °7
The task of destruction, therefore, is not one of des-
troying in order to replace the destroyed with something
newly created and equally concealing--it is rather one of
destroying in order to remove the accretions of history and
to let be the purity of primal insights. Dasein cannot turn
his back on his tradition because it is too much a part of
him, so he must ask the ontological question of that tradi-
tion and carefully destroy those elements which have hidden
Being rather than illuminating it. Dasein confronts his
task, not from the position of one rejecting his past, but
from that of one standing in and being held fast to that
from which he would flee.
And what is to be his criterion in this task of destruc-
tion? That primordial understanding which precedes all analy-
sis, judgment, and assertion--the understanding which is
"mine" alone but which hears the voice of Being in the
words of others who have succeeded in making their exper-
ience of Being explicit. Where the words have concealed
Being, we must go back of them to the experiences which pro-
duced them. The error of our tradition has been in freezing
that which should have remained fluid, of accepting the
words divorced from the dialogue itself. If the essence of
^Martin Heidegger, What is Philosophy? tr., William
Kluback and Jean T. Wilde (Hew York: Twayne Publishers, Inc.,
1958), p. 73.
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experience could be distilled and preserved for all time in
a word, then a representing vehicle such as "idea" would suf-
fice, but such is not the case. The experience is nothing
communicable apart from the interpretation, but the inter-
pretation is made by man after experiencing-
-by man a step
away from the exper ience--and so is never free of that which
the interpreter adds from out of himself. The more that is
added to an experience by way of interpreting, the more is
the experience concealed. ^8
88ln his study, Mysticism and Philosophy (New York: J.
B. Lippincott Company ,1960), p^ 37 , Walter St ace writes:
"I use the word 'interpretation' to mean anything which the
conceptual intellect adds to the experience for the purpose
of understanding it, whether what is added is only classifi-
catory concepts, or a logical inference, or an explanatory
hypothesis." Stace distinguishes between "low-level" and
"high-level" interpretation— low level interpretation being
that which is closest to a merely descriptive report, and
high-level that which includes a great deal of intellectual
addition. An experience of my own may serve to illustrate
this point. Several years ago I was attending a Quaker
international conference and on the last morning of the con-
ference took part in a silent meeting. Toward the end of
the period of meditation I began to feel strange. The
closest I can come to a bare description of the experience
is to speak of a heightened awareness accompanied by a much
exaggerated heart beat and a powerful urge to speak. Beyond
these physiological or psychological manifestations, there
was nothing. My subsequent high-level interpretation of the
experience as having been in the presence of God was un-
warranted by the experience. The idea of God which I had
added to the experience had entered my world through
tradition
.
Alfred North Whitehead deals with this question in his
"Concept of Nature": "No characteristic of nature which is
immediately posited for knowledge by sense-awareness can be
explained. It is impenetrable by thought, in the sense that
its peculiar . essent ial character which enters into experi-
ence by sense-awareness is for thought merely the guardian
of its individuality as a bare entity." (F. S. C. Northrop
and Mason Gross, op . cit . , p. 207.
"According to Taoism, the T ao (the Way) cannot be told,
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It is not easy to take part in the dialogue that pre-
serves the openness for Being, because to do so calls into
question everything that we have taken for granted.
If we penetrate to the ’source' ontologically
,
we donot come to things which are ontically obvious forthe common understanding'
;
but the questionable
character of everything obvious opens up for us. 89
The questioning of our tradition does not affirm the dogma
of our religious orientation (unless we refuse to take it
seriously) but rather demands a thorough examination of all
that we have accepted as true.
But if we decline to be taken in by surface appearances
we shall see that this question "why"
,
. . , has its
ground in a leap through which man thrusts away all theprevious security, whether real or imagined, of hislife. The question is asked only in this leap; it is
the leap; without it there is no asking.
. . .
We call
such. a leap, which opens up its own source,
. . .
thefinding of one's own ground. 90
If we are to take this leap, ask this question, "make our-
selves free for what speaks to us in tradition as the Being
of being", 91 we must abandon our religious security, for man
cannot really question without ceasing to be a be-
liever and taking all the consequences of such a step.
He will only be able to act "as if" ... On the other
hand a faith that does not perpetually expose itself
but only suggested. So when words are used, it is the sug-
gestiveness of the words, and not their fixed denotations or
connotations, .that reveals the Tao." (Bung Yu-lan, A Short
History of Chinese Philosophy
,
ed. Derk Bodde
,
/New York:
The Free Press, f966/, p. 137)
8 9 Being and Time
. p. 383 (334).
9QAn Introduction to Metaphysics
, pp. 5-6.
91See n. 87, p. 45 supra .
48
to the possibility of unfaith is no faith but merely
a convenience: the believer simply makes up his mind
to adhere to the traditional doctrine. This is
neither faith nor questioning
. .
.92
Man cannot question "without ceasing to be a believer
and taking all the consequences of such a step" and so too
often finds it safer to turn away from the voice that speaks
to him out of the silence, disturbing his complacency, or
else to coerce that speaking into the framework of his reli-
gious or philosophical orientation where it will not bother
him. He affirms that in his tradition which has become
fixed or static and denies the dynamism which would revital-
ize that tradition.
But if he has the "courage to be"--the courage to take
the leap from security into the Nothing--he may come to see
that the lifting of the veil of mystery and the illuminating
of Being (which is done in Christianity by a benevolent God
choosing to reveal more) depend on him. The "more" is re-
vealed by the originative act of Dasein reaching into the
Nothing of his own finitude and illuminating by bestowing
meaning. Where the power to reveal is surrendered to an
Other, man also surrenders the initiative for the search--
he surrenders his own being. Both man and Being suffer as
a consequence--both remain hidden--for "Being never essen-
tializes itself without Seienden, and Seienden cannot be
9
^
An Introduction to Metaphysics
,
p . 7
.
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without Being. "93 Being never appears in the world except
through man speaking, whether he speaks in the words of
philosopher, poet, artist, or musician.
In our everydayness we know that for a thing to be
present there must be a place for it, and for the thing to
appear in this place, the place itself must be held open.
:ian is holding the place open for the complete other
of being, so that in its openness there can be such
a thing as being present (Being). 94
If Being is not prior to and independent of what-is
,
then Being i_s and dwells in the world only as long as, and
when, there is a place for it to dwell, i.e., man speaking
authentically. If man confines his speaking to those areas
in which he feels "factually" secure, then he is, in effect,
refusing to give Being a voice in the world and neglecting
that whole realm of mystery, the Nothing, which is the ground
of Being itself. 95
93See n. 58, p. 32 supra .
94piartin Heidegger, The Question of Being
,
tr
.
William
Kluback and Jean T. Wilde”]! (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc.,
1958)
,
p. 97.
95"?rom What-is all the world of things was born
.But What-is sprang in turn from What-is-not .
"
(Verse 40
,
Tao Te Ching
,
op
.
cit
.
, p. 93.)
CHAPTER IV
BEING AND LANGUAGE
CHAPTER IV
BEING AND LANGUAGE
Is it the fault of "Being"
. . . that our words
fail in referring to it and only that remains on
which suspicion is cast all too hastily as "mysti-
cism"? Or is our language at fault for not yet
speaking because it is not yet able to adapt itself
to a reference to the essence of "Being"?9&
The question raised here is one that is implicit in
the writing of poetry. Being may be present in language
but never adequately represented _by it. Being is always
more than what has been said (or ever will be said) about
it. Being present in language means that Being speaks
through poets and philosophers for whom the first encounter
with Being may have come "in a metaphysical shock at the
limits of reason". 97 Heidegger raises a plea for the use
of language in such a way that it will reveal Being rather
than conceal it. It is not language as we ordinarily think
of it which needs reform because that which we refer to as
language is but "a stock of words and syntactical rules,
/and/ is only a threshhold of language". 9^ The reform
96fhe Question of Being
, p. 79.
97 See n. 80
,
p. 41 supra .
98"Hdlderlin and the Essence of Poetry", Werner Brock,
op. cit ., p. 277. For Heidegger, language is a speaking,
whether it be in words, in music, or in the media of the
artist
.
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called for is "not a new language but a transformed relation-
ship to the essenc(ing) of the old one". 99 This transformed
relationship is one of restoring an original purity which
has become clouded by centuries of interpretation in which
the interpreters have been serving not only Being itself,
but special interests of the "they" -world
.
The ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve
the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein
expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding
from levelling them off to that unintelligibility which
functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems
.
1 90
The first phase in the transforming of the relationship
between man and language occurs when man stands at the edge
of the abyss and sees Nothing. When the shock has eased, he
is confronted with the fact that his tradition has success-
fully concealed Being from him by building word structures
against the dread of the Nothing and by giving birth to the
idea of Being as independent of man--perhaps responsible for
him but certainly not to, him. In his re-examination of
tradition he will listen for the voice of Being as and where
it speaks but will set aside that which has served to con-
ceal it.
It is not that men cannot benefit from the experience
of those who have lived in the past--indeed it is by making
99Martin Heidegger, a letter to the author in Preface
to William J. Richardson, S. J., Heidegger--Thr ough
Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963),
p. xxii.
IQQBeing and Time
,
p. 262 (220).
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the past his own that he becomes aware of the possibilities
which the inquiry offers. 10
"
1 It is only when man is domin-
ated
_by his tradition rather than being master of it that he
interprets his experience in static terms. He can minimize
the domination of tradition by greater understanding of his-
tory even as he can minimize the domination of his personal
past by a greater understanding of himself and that past.
The second phase of the transformation of man's rela-
tionship to language, then, is the explicit awareness that
the word has often proved inadequate to its task and that
the traditional word is not unassailable.
Western thought has developed in a framework that has
given too little consideration to the facts: 1) that Being
can be investigated only "insofar as /it7
. . . enters into
the intelligibility of Dasein"; 2) that it "becomes acces-
sible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of
meaninglessness";’102 and 3) that this meaning is not a
101 Quoting Scheler (from Edmund Husserl's Jahr buch fur
Phllosophie und phanomenologische Forschung
,
Vo 1 . Tl7 p. 243
)
Heidegger writes: "The person 'is rather the unity of liv-
ing-through ^Er-lebens7 which is immediately experienced in
and with our Experiences— not a Thing merely thought of be-
hind and outside what is immediately Experienced'." ( Being
and T ime
, p. 73 • The translators of Being and Time use
the upper case "T " for Thing when it translates the German
Ding and the lower case "t" for thing when it translates
Sache
. ) Heidegger is quoting Scheler in support of his own
position that the phenomenal content of Dasein cannot be ex-
pressed as "subject" or "object" but is rather a unity of
experience in which awareness of the past and anticipation
of the future join to increase awareness of the present,
thus giving meaning (authenticity) to the present.
10 2Being and Time
, p. 194- (152).
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property of that which is understood but is, rather, a pro-
jection of Dasein' s, grounded in that which Heidegger calls
___ j
"fore-having /Vorhabe7" or that which Dasein has or is, as
understanding, before assigning meaning to a new particular
of experience.
The interpretation of experience always operates in a
context of involvements already belonging to Dasein and is
always guided by a point of view which is held in advance of
the act of interpretation. Furthermore, such interpretation
always involves choice. Being is always more than what is
spoken or written and whenever man interprets his experi-
ence, he is making choices, judgments, considering the ex-
perience from this way and that. Beyond that which he offers
as interpretation, there is always more—there is always that
on which he has turned his back and that of which he was not
even aware. Dasein speaks out of finite experience which is
necessarily shaped not only by his conscious choices but by
his capability, his vision, and his historical orientation . 1
And just beyond the word he speaks is the hint, the sugges-
tion, the elusive not-quite-clear which may reveal itself
to him but then be gone before he can speak the word that
would render it available to another.
1 03" Historical orientation" is used here in a broad
sense. It represents all my past up to and even including
part of the moment of speaking. I may begin to speak and
then alter what I am about to say on the basis of what I
have just heard myself saying.
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Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-
state-of-mind and a co-understanding, in discourseBeing-with becomes 'explicitly' shared
: that is to
say, it jLs already, but is unshared as something thathas been taken hold of and appropriated. 10 ^
The ancient Greeks saw the logos (^i^i) 105 as a uni-
fying principle— that which would make us whole and would
draw us one to the other, even as our opinionated everyday
-
ness tends to alienate us from ourselves and from each other.
Heidegger has re-interpreted logos to mean discourse (Rede).
Discourse lets something be seen. Its function is to reveal.
It lets us see ourselves and each other and our world.
Through discourse the "intrinsic togetherness" of man is
realized. Logos is effective only when man assumes a recep-
tive, listening attitude 106 and, for the most part, man
operates in the divisive area of opinion. Grasping after
fragments of experience sends men off in diverse directions
and deceives them into placing undue importance on opinion.
10^Being and Time
, p. 205 (162).
10 5See An Introduction to Metaphysics
, pp. 1 30 ff
.
106one hears the subtle power of a great symphony by
laying oneself open to it. A concentrated effort to hear is
much more likely to result in not hearing. One man may sit
with a score in his lap and follow the notes with his finger
yet, in his concentrated attention, completely miss that
which his neighbor with the half-closed eyes is hearing.
Even as the soul of the music is not to be found in the
score, so Being is concealed from those who would locate it
in the minutiae examined by the probing intellect. Heidegger
speaks of this as being "present yet absent". ( Ibid .
,
p. 130.)
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It is one of the tragedies of the modern scene that the
divisive force of opinion seems to be greater than the uni-
^ylng force of logos
,
and one of its ironies that this is in
part a result of man seeking collective security.
Heidegger sees the conversation between the ancients
and Plato characterized by the destruction of the felt cor-
respondence with Being and a subsequent orientation of man
apart from Being. 107 Man is no longer one with Being, he is
searching for it and asking about it. Truth is no longer
that which unfolds "out of its own essential fullness as the
essence of unhiddenness
,
but shifts its abode to the essence
of the idea". 10 ® As man corrects his vision, he approaches
the truth and this approach is made possible by the attrac-
tion of the ideas themselves. The Idea thus becomes "master,
dispensing both unhiddenness (to what emerges) and the
ability to perceive (the unhidden) ". 1 09 Being belongs to
107This shift in emphasis coincides with the degenera-
tion of religion from a living faith to an intellectual
affirmation— that which Martin Buber characterizes as an
"eclipse of God". (See Martin Buber, Two Types of Faith
^ew York: Harper and Brothers, 1 9 6j_/ , pp . 1 70 ff . ) In”
Judaism it was the confrontation with a living God that was
basic and the transition into the complex dogma of Pauline
Christianity was accompanied by a loss of vitality.
lO^Martin Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth", tr
.
John Barlow, William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, op. cit
.
,
p. 265.
109piato, The Republic
,
Book VII, 517c. Quoted by
Heidegger, Ibid
.
Heidegger's translation was used because
the language suited the discussion. But because I also re-
fer to Plato's use of the word "light" I am including the
following translation from The Dialogues of Plato , tr . B.
Jowett, (New York: Random House
, 1937), p. 77 6 : "The idea
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the world of ideas. The extent to which men share in that
world depends on the correctness of their vision. Our
access to Being is through our ideas about entities, our
approach to the idea of Good is through the refining of those
ideas. Being is confined to the world of ideas and is sub-
ordinated to the Idea of Good. The Idea of Good is the
"lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate
source of reason and truth in the intellectual" . 1 1
0
of good ... is inferred to be the universal author of all
things beautiful and right, parent of light and lord of
light in this visible world, and the immediate source of
reason and truth in the intellectual;
. .
llOSee n. 109 supra
. This subordination of Being to
the Idea of Good marked the beginning of the radical separa-
tion of good and evil which has plagued our tradition ever
since. The earlier meaning of Being embraced the belonging-
together of antagonisms but the elevation of reason and good
acted as a dichotomizing force, separating the world of mind
and the world of nature and accomplishing a radical devalua-
tion of natural man. This devaluation carried over into the
Christian notion of the supremacy of the perfect immortal
over the imperfect mortal. The West, since Plato, has
struggled against dualism and toward an ideal of perfection
in which the good will be victorious over the evil.
The traditions of India and China have no such struggle
against dualism. In Hindu thought, lightness and darkness--
as well as all the other pairs of opposites--are but phenom-
enal manifestations of an all-embracing reality which is
beyond such distinctions. Man’s enlightenment is the recog-
nition of the illusory nature of the distinctions. This
teaching is dramatically symbolized in Indian art by Kali in
her role as the Black Goddess. (See Heinrich Zimmer, Myths
and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization
,
ed., Joseph
Campbell, /New York: Pantheon Press, 19^6/ pp. 90-102.)
Chinese thought does not take the step beyond the phenomenal
(except, as in Buddhism, to posit the Void). Since there is
nothing outside of the organic whole, all that is belongs,
and belongs essentially. The Yin and the Yang, as the ele-
ments of opposition, are component elements of everything.
Confucianism represents the Yang element of Chinese thought,
and Taoism the Yin. This organic unity has made for
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Aristotle denied the reality 0f Plato's independent
ideal world and sought in man for that indefinable something
which was the reality of being. But for Aristotle the es-
sence of man was being and the primary meaning of being was
substance
.
And indeed the question which was raised of old andis raised now and always, and is always the subject
of doubt, namely, what being is, is just the question*
what is substance? 1 1
1
Aristotle did not neglect existence but he made it that
which we come up against as we press back in our investiga-
tion of the things that are. How do we know that a thing is?
We see it "being tall" or "being white"--giving being to
sensible qualities--, or "being a man" or "being a horse"
exhibiting characteristics of a particular kind of entity.
Ousia ( ou tr t
a
) is that which "stands under" or supports the
various determinants which enable us to know what a thing is.
It is that inner principle which accounts for the particular
organization of matter in this way or that—the principle
which determines whether we call an entity a man or a tree.
This principle of organization is Aristotle's form. Both
men and trees are
,
but a man i_s a man and a tree i_s a tree,
an eclecticism which made it possible for "the active
/Gonfucian7 bureaucrat of the morning /to/ become the dreamy
/Taoist/ poet or nature lover of the evening". (See Edwin
0. Reischauer and John King Fair bank, East Asia: The Great
Tradition /Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co7"i 1960/, pp. 76-7.)
1 1 Aristotle
,
Metaphysics
,
Z, I, 1028 a 13. Oited in
Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 46.
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and a man is not a tree. We are less Interested in the
shared "is-ness" of the man and the tree than we are in the
unshared "what-ness".
Aristotle did say, "Among the many meanings of being,
the first is the one where it means that which Is ", but he
went on to qualify this by adding, "and where it signifies
the substance". 112 To know Being, we study existing enti-
ties but we study them, not in their existence, as such, but
in the common attributes which testify to that existence.
The individuals comprised within a species, such as
Socrates and Coriscos, are the real beings; but in-
asmuch as these individuals possess one common
specific form, it will suffice to state the univer-
sal attributes of the species, that is, the attri-
butes common to all its individuals, once for all. 11 ^
Aristotle's equating of Being and substance led him to seek
Being through particular entities in their ontical present-
at-handness. But Heidegger contends that "entitles with
Dasein's kind of Being cannot be conceived in terms of
1 1
2
Ibld.
1
1
^Aristotle
,
Be Partlbus animalium
, A, 4, 644a 23-27.
Etienne Gilson, op. cit
.
, p. 50, uses this but refers us to
Selections
,
ed.
,
Ross, n. 54, pp. 173-4.
In his commentary, Gilson says, "Had Plato lived long
enough to read, in the First Book of Aristotle's Metaphysics,
the criticism of his own doctrine of ideas, he might have
written one more dialogue, the Arlstoteles
,
in which it
would have been child's play for Socrates to get Aristotle
entangled in hopeless difficulties." Gilson then treats the
reader to a bit of Platonic dialogue which concludes with:
"Then, my lad, I wish you could tell me how it may be that
beings are through sharing in an essence, which itself is
not 1 " ( Op . cit . , pp. 49-50.) At this point it seems to me
that the primary difficulty Aristotle had was in being un-
able to acknowledge the essential nothingness of his substance.
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Reality and substantiality; we have expressed this by the
thesis that the substance of man is existence ^ 4 in exist-
ing, Dasein understands himself (either authentically or in-
authentlcally) and projects that understanding onto the
entities which he encounters in the world.
Entities 'have' meaning only because, as Beingwhich
has been disclosed beforehand ^in my own being/ they
become intelligible in the projection of that Being
that is to sav, in terms of the "upon-which" of that
projection. 1
1
5
A glance at previous ontology shows that if one
fails to see Being-in-the-wor Id as a state of Dasein,
the phenomenon of worldhood likewise gets passed over
.
One tries instead to Interpret the world in terms of
the Being of those entities which are present-at-hand
within-the-world
. . .
namely, in terms of Nature.
.
. .
Only in some definite mode of its own Being-in-
the-world can Dasein discover entities as Nature
It was in the mode of scientific-inquirer-in- the-world
that Aristotle projected his understanding on to the enti-
ties of his world. He didn't press his inquiry into the
elusive "something" that was the reality of being because
he was Aristotle, with a particular historical and personal
orientation that shaped his way of interpreting experience—
a fact that he either did not recognize or did not consider
necessary to his knowledge of entities. He looked at the
entities of the world through the eyes of a biologist and
from a world which knew that "out of nothing, nothing could
come"
.
His underlying reality had to be something .
^ ^Being and Time
,
p. 255 (212).
1 I5ibid.
, p . 372 (324)
.
1 1 6ibid
. ,
p. 93 (65).
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Aristotle could not acknowledge it as nothing because he had
not experienced the anguish of modern man—the anguish that
has resulted from the attempts to hide this nothingness
under metaphysical structures. He stood at the dynamic
beginning of a tradition. Modern man stands at the end of
that tradition—with nowhere to go.
Aristotle’s second contribution to the problem of Being
was in giving birth to the definition of truth as agreement
between judgment and its object. 11 ? Heidegger's Dasein is
"in the truth" in the sense that "the disclosedness of its
ownmost Being belongs to its existential constitution"
.
1 1 8
Standing "in the truth", Dasein goes on to uncover or dis-
close entities in the world, and those entities are "true"
to the extent that Dasein succeeds in disclosing them. His
first step into assertion about these entities which have
stood before him unconcealed, however, is his first step
into error, for perceiving is approaching entities in such
a way as to let them be , but assertion is an adding to or
interpreting of which conceals even as it reveals.
Heidegger has recognized that the traditional concep-
tion of truth as agreement has failed to consider the change
1 ^Although Heidegger defends Aristotle against this
misuse of his thesis ( Ibid . , p. 268 f22§J) , he nonetheless
recognizes that it was Aristotle ’ s , "the false and the true
are not in the act (itself) . . . but in the understanding"
(Metaphysics , E, 4, 1027b, 25 sq., Cited in "Plato's Doctrine
of Truth' 1
,
Barrett and Aiken, op
,
c It
. , p. 266), that gave
rise to the definition of truth as ''adequation of intellect
to thing" ( Being and Time , p. 257 /2147» n - 2).
1 1
8
Ibid
.
,
p. 263 (221).
62
of character that occurs when disclosedness (or the revela-
tion of the Being of an entity) is expressed, and further
when that expression is related to the entity itself. The
assertion is one step away from the original disclosedness
and the attempt to relate the assertion and the entity is
another, which transforms all the elements to present-at-
hand elements. The relation is the present— at—hand agree-
ment of a pre sent-at-hand assertion with a present-at-hand
entity. ^9 i n this process of change, truth as disclosed-
ness, as a form of Being which uncovers, disappears, and
"truth as agreement between things which are present-at-
hand within-the-world" 1 20 becomes the accepted definition.
We have lost sight of the fact that truth as agreement is
ont ologically derivative from and dependent on truth as
disclosure
.
1 21
The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered
up by Daseln's very understanding of Being—that
understanding which is proxltnally the one that pre-
vails, and which even today has not been surmounted
explicitly and in principle
The most primordial 'truth* is the 'locus' of asser-
tion; it is the ontological condition for the possi-
bility that assertions can be either true or false--
that they may uncover or cover things up. 1 22
11 9lt is only in regarding entities as present-at-hand
that we encounter properties, an encounter which takes
place as we move around entities and observe.
^OBeing and Time
, p. 268 (225).
121 Ibid.
1 2 2j bid
.
,
pp. 268-9 (225-6).
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Whereas Heidegger locates truth in the disclosure it-
self (in perception), Plato and Aristotle, and the main-
stream of Western tradition since, have located it in the
interpretation of that disclosure. In both cases truth is
dependent on man, but Heidegger recognizes and acknowledges
the fact, while classical thinkers posited an absolute truth
or source of truth to which man aspired and toward which he
progressed coincident with the "correcting of his vision". 123
Traditional metaphysics sought the Being of the
things-that-are and the ground of their intelligi-
bility, their sufficient reason, in another Seiende
,
a super-thing existing in a world beyond the senses.
Heidegger now shows that this "Being", this "principle
of sufficient reason", is "no thing", no substance,
no creativity on the part of an ideal absolute, but
the Dasein-f ounded possibility that there be a world
in which things "can be" and "can be discovered". If
this possibility lies in Man it is precisely because
he is capable of being more than "thing", more than
"substance", without being infinite absolute, yet
without being merely "present" as a tree or a house
is "present" . 1 24
The absolute Other of tradition, whether it was God or
world intellect or Plato's Idea of Good, was something
which was "there" in an independent sense. The phenomena
encountered in the world might reflect the absolute but were
always inferior t_o it, and the absolute was in no way de-
pendent upon the phenomena.
123Laszlo Versenyi, in his Heidegger, Being, and Truth
,
charges Heidegger with being caught in the very egocentric
orientation that he criticizes in Western tradition. I have
dealt with some of the specifics of Versenyi' s charge in the
Appendix.
12
^Thomas Langan, op . cit .
,
p. 91.
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The world, as shared, began in the word— in that which
man spoke out of the wonder of his experience and the need
to communicate. But when the word became man's master
rather than his servant, the world of the concept acquired
Independence and greater reality than that which it was
born to serve and, further, developed to embrace ideas
which have no counterpart in the world of experience--those
ideas which we refer to as "abstract ", 1 25
The abstract ideas are useful to man in relating his
experiences and in projecting beyond them but they are still
deceptive in appearing to represent some greater reality
than we encounter through immediate perception.
Truth as agreement between the judgment of a knowing
subject and the reality of a known object sets up a dualism
in which knowing man is superior to that which he knows, but,
as Heidegger says, "subject and object do not coincide with
1 25Arthur Waley, in his book The Way and Its Power
(New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1958), p. 59 > offers a good
example of the Chinese attitude toward such ideas. The
example is based on Chuang Tzu XXXIII, 7, and deals with the
concept of "infinity”! "Take a stick a foot long. Halve
it. Tomorrow halve that half, and so on day after day. Ten
thousand generations hence there will still, theoretically
speaking, be something left to halve. But in reality we
are obliged to stop short much sooner than this, even though
we may suppose that with better eyes and a sharper knife we
could still go on."
Whitehead, in his "Concept of Nature" ( loc . cit .
, pp.
199 ff.), deals with the problem of abstraction . He tells
us that experience embodies the potential for division into
units--which he calls "actual occasions" --but does not give
us experiential evidence of such division except as we con-
sciously abstract. Our experience is relational and con-
tinuous--not atomically divided. And in this, Whitehead
seems very close to Heidegger.
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Casein and the world". 126 In whatever way man relates to
his world, he will know his world. 127 if h e merely "tarries
alongside" 1 entities in the world, he will look at them,
compare them and make assertions about them, but this Is a
deficient mode of being-in-the-world in which he is not con-
cernfully involved with the entities of his environment but
is content to relate to them in the way they look.
Common sense concerns itself, whether 'theoretically 1
or practically
,
only with entities which can be sur-
veyed at a glance cir cumspectively
. What is distinc-
tive in common sense is that it has in view only the
experiencing of 'factual' entities, in order that it
may be able to rid itself of an understanding of
Being. It fails to recognize that entities can be
experienced 'factually' only when Being is already
understood, even if it has not been conceptualized. 1 29
2 6g ejng and Time
, p. 87 (60). Such a dichotomy arises
when we see the known object (world), as wholly other than
and separate from the knowing subject (man)
,
and when the
knowing faculty itself is seen as a bridge across this gulf
but a bridge supported by a supreme intelligence.
127u 0es the objective observer ever "know" the piano in
the way in which the concert pianist knows it? Could any
scientific observer "know" my baby in the way I know her?
The objective observer looks at entities in respect of their
likeness; the concert pianist knows his piano, and the mother
her baby, in respect of their uniqueness--a uniqueness that
cannot be perceived by moving around and looking at some-
thing, but is known only through concernful involvement
with It
.
1
qO
"Tarrying alongside" is distinguished from "dwelling-
alongside" by a lack of concernful involvement. Dasein is
Being-in-the-world, and as such is a unitary phenomenon.
"Being-alongside" is constitutive of Dasein and conveys the
notion of being absorbed in, as in a task. "Tarrying" is a
deficient mode of dwelling. (See Being and Time, pp. 86 ff.
/So ff/7.
1 29 i bid
.
, p. 363 (315).
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It is in the realm of common sense that opinion is pro-
duced. Discourse attempts to give expression to experience
but the extent to which it succeeds depends on the relation
of man to his world. When he relates in a deficient mode--
the mode of tarrying alongside--then his assertions about
experience will be concealing. When he is dwelling authen-
tically, i.e., concernf ully
,
in his world and is transparent
to himself, his explication of his understanding will be a
revealing of Being in the world. 130 Only as man lives his
life intentionally and concernf ully
,
while maintaining him-
self in an open, listening posture, does Being show itself.
Only through Dasein is there truth.
Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor
will there be any after Dasein is no more. For in
such a case truth as disclosedness
,
uncovering, and
uncoveredness, cannot be
Once entities have been uncovered, they show them-
selves precisely as entities which beforehand already
were. Such uncovering is the kind of Being which
belongs to 'truth*. 131
Although essentially "in the truth" Dasein dwells for
the most part in untruth because every grasp of what- is is
at the same time a shrouding of the mystery of the totality,
130jn paraphrasing a section of Verse 40 of the Tao T
Ching, translator R. B. Blakney writes: The Way "is a re-
turn to within one's self where the ultimate mystery of
being can eventually be confronted." (p. 93)
From Suzuki ( op. cit . , p. 165), citing Zen master Hui-
Neng, we hear: "Seeing into one's self-nature is seeing
into nothingness.. . . and this seeing is the illuminating
of this world of multiplicity by the light of Prajna /wis-
dom, discernment/.
"
131 Being and Time
,
p. 269 (226).
CD>
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and most of Lasein's everyday effort goes into contending
with bits of experience which effectively conceal the total
ity to which they belong. Whatever truth is spoken is al-
ways accompanied by the untruth of that which is unspoken,
thus remaining hidden and becoming even more so as the
spoken truth is positively affirmed. And so it is that
man's moments of vision have oftentimes been recorded in
words which have actually concealed the truth they were
meant to convey.
To what extent is language the "most dangerous of
possessions"?
Language has the task of making manifest in its
work the existent, and of preserving it as such.
In it, what is purest and what is most concealed,
and likewise what is complex and ordinary, can be
expressed in words. . . . The pure and the ordin-
ary are both equally something said. Hence the
word as word never gives any direct guarantee as to
whether it is an essential word or a counterfeit.
.
. .
Therefore, language must constantly present
itself in an appearance which it itself attests,
and hence endanger what is most characteristic of
it, the genuine saying . 1 32
The third phase of the transformation of man's rela-
tionship to language involves, then, the task of communi-
cating the awareness he has won for himself while trying
to avoid the danger inherent in the use of words--the danger
that the pointing finger will be mistaken for the moon . 1 33
1 32"H61derlin and the Essence of Poetry", Werner Brock,
op. cit . , pp. 275-6.
133"To point at the moon a finger is needed, but woe to
those who take the finger for the moon." (D. T. Suzuki,
op. cit.
,
p. 8.
)
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The attempt to communicate is an attempt to share ex-
perience, and it is made by means of conversation. 1 34
The being of men is founded in language. But this
only becomes actual in conversation.
. . . But now
what is meant by "a conversation"? Plainly, the act
of speaking with others about something. Then speak-ing also brings about the process of coming together.
. . .
vie are a conversation
. . . we are a single
conversation.
. . . Conversation and its unity sup-
port our existence . 1 35
Dasein can never be seen wholly in isolation--he is
always Being-alongside his world and Being-with other enti-
ties who have the character of Dasein. But he is constantly
thwarted in his attempts to share his experience because
each man gives his own meaning to experience and makes it
explicit in terms of that meaning. Each man's experience
is unique and so is the interpretation of that experience.
Hence there will be variation in the interpretation of even
those experiences which seem much alike. As he tries to
share his experience through making it explicit he may find
that each step into explication takes him a step farther
away from the bne with whom he is trying to converse. 1 36
^^Here
,
as with the word "language", we must take the
broadest possible view of conversation.
1 35" Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry", Werner Brock,
op. cit
.
, pp. 277-8.
1 36"
> . 4 Words strain,
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
Will not stay still. Shrieking voices
Scolding, mocking, or merely chattering,
Always assail them. ... (T. S. Eliot, "Burnt
Norton", op . cit .
, pp. 7-8.)
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The attempt to converse meaningfully, however, will be
either helped or hindered by the care he takes with the use
of language and the degree to which his language reflects
its dwelling-place character.
Authentic conversing is carried on through the nurtur-
ing of our correspondence with Being. When philosophy
attends to this correspondence, it is a basic and authentic
speaking, a being-on-a-path
,
on the way, a permanent quest
in which Being is disclosed" . 1 37
1 37j ean T. Wilde and William Kimmel, The Search for
Be_in_g
,
p. 491. Here the editors are paraphrasing Heidegger's
emphasis in Holzwege
.
In Hindu thought, the path is through intellect to
beyond--t o the acceptance of the identification of Brahman
and Atman (Being.and Self). The Buddhist takes the further
step of predicating the source of this oneness as the Void,
but the path to the recognition of the Void leads through
self transformation. "To enter the Buddhist vehicle--the
boat of the discipline—means to begin to cross the river
of life, from the shore of the common-sense experience of
non-enlightenment, the shore of spiritual ignorance (avidya),
desire (kama)
,
and death (mara)
,
to the yonder bank of trans-
cendental wisdom (vidya), which is liberation (moksa) from
this general bondage." (Zimmer, Philosophies of India, p.
475.) When one attains this other shore, however, and turns
around to look at the river and the land from which he began
his journey, he sees nothing: "The whole scene of the two
banks and the river between is simply gone. There can be no
such thing for the enlightened eye and mind, because to see
or think of anything as something 'other' (a distant reality
different from one's own being) would mean that full Enlighten-
ment had not yet been attained. There can be an 'other
shore' only for people still in the spheres of dualistic per-
ception; those this side the stream or still inside the boat
and heading for the 'other shore'; those who have not yet
disembarked and thrown away the raft. Illumination means
that the delusory distinction between the two shores of a
worldly and a transcendental existence no longer holds.
There is no stream of rebirths flowing between two separated
shores: no samsara and no nirvana." ( Ibid .
,
p. 479)
In Taoism, the Way or the Path is a return to primal
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Philosophy is the correspondence to the Being of beingbut not until, and only when, the correspondence is
actually fulfilled and thereby unfolds itself and ex-pands this unfoldment. This correspondence occurs indifferent ways according to how the appeal of Being
speaks, according to whether it is heard or not heard
and according to whether what is heard is said or kent
silent.
i
jo F
pur ity--t o the mirror knowledge of the identification of
Being and Nothing.
"The student learns by daily increment
The Way is gained by daily loss
The world is won by those who let it go." (Verse
48, Tao Te Ghing
,
loc
.
cit
.
, p. 101.)
The essence of Zen is the art of seeing into the nature
of one's own being. It reflects both its source in Mahayana
Buddhism and the influence of Chinese Taoism but goes beyond
both in its complete rejection of conceptualization on the
grounds of its inadequacy to the task of a genuine speaking.
Suzuki writes: "Reasoning defeats itself, finds itself al-
together futile, in its attempt to reach sunyata
,
because
reasoning, instead of trying to see sunyata itself in the
process of reasoning, strives to reach sunyata as the goal
of reasoning, that is, when all the reasoning comes to an
end. When we the reasoners realize that sunyata is working,
in reasoning itself, that reasoning is no other than sunyata
in disguise, we know sunyata
,
we see sunyata
,
and this is
sunyata knowing and seeing itself; and so, we can say that
when sunyata knows itself it is not sunyata but we ourselves
as sunyata
.
Sunyata knows itself through us, because we are
sunyata
.
When dunyata is awakened to itself or becomes
aware of itself, which is 'knowing and seeing' itself, we
have another name for it: sunyata is tathata
,
'suchness'."
(D. T. Suzuki, op . cit .
, p . 263 . ) (In the foregoing passage,
the terms tathata and sunyata may be taken as roughly equiva-
lent to Heidegger's terms Being and Nothing
.
)
When philosophizing is authentic speaking, when it is
a being-on-a-path
,
it is not an isolated and sterile activity;
it is serving the end of self transf ormation--the end of
giving Being a place in the world. The Zen master may speak
with a crack of a stick over the head, he may speak of an
iron flute with no mouthpiece and no holes (See The Iron
Flute
,
ed
.
Nyogen Senzaki and Ruth Strout HcCandless,
/Rutland
,
Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 196j_7> P* 13),
but if the disciple gets the message, then the correspond-
ence with Being is fulfilled and unfolded.
1 3 Qwhat is Philosophy? p . 75.
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The primordial understanding necessary to such speaking is
bb-ere bn Inan but is often neglected or even spurned. When
it is allowed to unfold, however, and Dasein speaks, then he
will share his understanding if there is another entity with
the character of Dasein who is listening and who hears.
Therefore has language, most dangerous of possessions,
been given to man ... so that he may affirm what
he is. 139
Being reveals itself to man in the silence of his listening
and the attempt to communicate is a form of self affirma-
tion. Insofar as he is able to give expression to his aware-
ness, he lends authenticity to his own existence and gives
Being a place of unconcealment. The manner in which he
speaks will be determined in part by his own potentiality
and in part by his choice of language. The artist shuns
the word, the philosopher grapples with it constantly, the
poet endows it with new meaning; but regardless of the form,
all such speaking has its root in the silence in which
Dasein hears and understands, and its motive power in the
demand that he "radiate the light of new intelligence from
his own resources, i.e., from out of the Nothing, to
illumine the We sen"
.
1
1 39Holderlin
9
iv, 246. Quoted by Heidegger, "Holderlin
and the Essence of Poetry", Werner Brock, or. cit ., p. 270.
I40^homas Langan, op . cit .
,
p. 11
8
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CONCLUSION
Western philosophy was born in the intellectual curi-
osity of men about a world looked at as "other"; Eastern
philosophy was born in the need for intellectual understand-
ing of the suffering of men. Each tradition followed its
own course and a gulf of misunderstanding developed.
Martin Heidegger sees modern Western man as suffering
from his alienation from Being--living in a time of need and
in a mood of anxiety. Having challenged his religious heri-
tage, he has found no satisfactory substitute in a science
increasingly aware of its own dynamic nature. He cannot
turn to science for the security of static concepts because
science today is questioning its own concepts. He still
seeks conceptual stabilization of that which he uncovers in
the world, while both the world itself and those who attempt
to know it are constantly changing.
When Heidegger speaks of alienation and anxiety, he
speaks of suffering. When he speaks of suffering he speaks
from the same need that has moved Eastern man to speak. I
see this as an important step in the direction of bridging
the East-West gulf. Modern man's technology is rapidly
becoming his master rather than his servant yet his failure
to recognize this makes him seek further in the direction
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of technological refinement, believing that it holds the
promise of relieving the nagging dissatisfaction which he
vaguely feels but cannot identify.
Heidegger is calling into question the ontological
ground in which most Western thought is rooted and from
which come the heretofore unquestioned premises on which our
great philosophical systems have been built. He is calling
into question the values related to and dependent on that
tradition; indeed he is calling into question the very
notion of value itself. Yet all of his questioning seems
to lead nowhere. There is nothing with which to replace the
destroyed— there is only the darkness and emptiness and,
perhaps, the awareness that what we have destroyed was
created by others who, like ourselves, wanted to dispel the
darkness
.
But is it not possible that the darkness itself— the
Nothing--is the reality in the sense of its being that in-
comprehensible totality which we encounter in dread--that
totality out of which the what- is of our experience steps
momentarily in the illumination of insight? Heidegger's
answer would, I believe, be Yes, and the Taoist says,
Gome with me
To the palace of Nowhere
Where all the many things are one.'^l
Heidegger's question has been undertaken in the mood of
modern Western man--the mood of anxiety. It is not
1
^1 Interpreted by Thomas Merton, The Way of Chuang Tzu
(New York: New Directions Publishing Corp. , 19 ^5 ) > p. 124
75
intellectual curiosity that moves Heidegger to speak--it is
the pain of alienation--of isolation--the pain of the lonely
individual who would converse with his fellow man but is
acutely aware of the danger of using words, the individual
who is committed to the task of keeping Being alive in the
world, but is circumscribed in his speaking by what he is--
by the limitations of his pastness and even of his potential,
by all that will make his speaking a concealing even as he
struggles to reveal.
He has discovered that the pain eases with the recogni-
tion that as we reduce the domination of pastness--of history
and tradition—we create the open space into which Being can
step for recognition and illumination. His attempts to give
expression to this recognition have been variously heralded.
To some, his speaking is what he intended— the light of
understanding cast into the shadows, giving illumination to
much that had been buried and lost to view; to others, his
speaking has been an obscuring, or at best a confusing.
We have viewed reality through the eyes of logic and
the Judeo-Chr istian tradition. We have been deaf to the
voice of Being speaking in any language other than that of
this tradition. Heidegger's speaking is almost as alien to
us as is the speaking of the East, for he too speaks of the
Nothing as the ground of Being, he too suggests that the
path to Being is through oneself, and he too hears the
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voice of Being speaking out of the silence that surrounds
and encompasses all but makes all speaking possible. 142
Now perhaps if we can resist the temptation to ease our
alienation by supplying deceptive paliatives and building
metaphysical structures which will again, in turn, have to
be destroyed, we may come to recognize need as the necessary
condition for fulfillment— both for Being itself and for
individual human being. In his need, man may come to a
greater awareness of himself. His primordial understanding
will remain hidden from him until he is able and willing to
silence the prattle of the "they” but once he has done this
he will begin to hear and have something to say.
Keeping silent authentically is possible only in
genuine discoursing. To be able to keep silent,
Dasein must have something to say— that is, it must
have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosed-
ness of itself. In that case one’s reticence
j^Ver schwiegenheit7 makes something manifest, and
does away with 'idle talk' /^Gerede^y7 *
Genuine discoursing, then, involves not only the ability
to speak but the ability to be silent. The single conversa-
tion to which Heidegger refers is a conversation consisting
as much of what is not said as of what is.
l4-2in the Upani^adic doctrine the syllable OM expresses
all that has become, is becoming, and will become. The
silence that follows and surrounds the syllable is that
sphere which is beyond the phenomenal yet one with it. The
phenomenal, represented by the sound of the syllable, is
short-lived, but the silence--deep and abiding and ever-
present--is the very condition for the possibility of the
sound. (See Heinrich Zimmer, Philosophies of India , pp. 372-8)
l4-3Being and Time
,
p. 208 ( 1 65 ) -
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History depends on the being-made-explicit of the dis-
closure of the world (a world that is there in an ontical
sense but which can be known only through individual Dasein
sharing his understanding and then engaging in an on-going
dialogue aimed at re-interpreting those expressions which
seem to have been concealing of experience rather than re-
vealing. In this historical process, the on-going dialogue,
Dasein makes no radical break with his predecessors and does
not fail to acknowledge his indebtedness to them for that
which they have revealed. But neither does he fail, out of
blind reverence for the past, to challenge them in those
areas where their assertions have buried truth. It is being
involved in this dialogue that makes man aware of the unity
of Being, even though the dialogue is carried on across
time and space, even though at times the essence of the
dialogue is in the silence between the lines and around the
words that are spoken.
It is Heidegger’s recognition of the difficulties in-
herent in giving expression to the encounter with Being
that has led him to the side of the poet and also, perhaps,
to the side of the man of the East. In the poet he hears
the man who cannot ignore the voice of Being, cannot give
conceptual formulation to his hearing, but must, nonetheless,
say to the world, "I have heard", and in speaking reduce that
sense of alienation from Being with which he is afflicted.
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It is the poet--whether he speaks out of the tradition
of the East or the West--who speaks of "the retreat to one’s
roots", of "the Way", of a "homecoming" which is at once a
coming back to oneself and to the source, of "the great
stillness", of the "Void" or the "Nothing", of "the still
point"
.
This speaking is Dasein—Being there.
APPENDIX
Laszlo Versenyi, in Heidegger, Being, and Truth , levels
a number of major criticisms at Heidegger but the two I atn
interested in discussing are: 1) that his philosophy, while
purporting to go beyond the relativistic, subjectivistic,
humanism of his predecessors, actually is itself highly
relativistic, subjectivistic and humanistic; and 2) that
Heidegger abandons himself to the urge to take the "leap
beyond the edge of rationality" and in so doing is "carried
far beyond the realm of responsible thought". 144 Relative
to the first criticism, Versenyi writes:
A relativistic philosophy is characterized, according
to Heidegger, by giving man a preferential position in
the midst of all, by making him the measure of all that
is, and by circling, incessantly, about man as the ab-
solute center of all things. By this definition
Being and Time is relativistic .' 45
Since Dasein is concerned about its own Being, the
world becomes the complex of Dasein' s concerns. Since
Dasein is directed toward its own Being as its final
purpose, the world becomes the totality of Dasein'
s
purposive relationships (with Dasein at its center),
and all that is in the world is encountered as a
utensil located within a teleological referential
context.
. . .
here not only truth but even Being is
located in the human under standing . 1 46
l) Heidegger's philosophy, far from confining man to
the egocentric predicament, offers him real access to the
1 ^Laszlo Versenyi, op . cit .
,
pp. 174-5.
I45ibid
.
, pp. 77-8. U6lbid . , pp. 79-80.
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world, around him--an access which depends on what I shall
call (for want of a better word) Dasein-recognition, or
man's recognition of himself as Being-there
. Being in other
entities becomes more apparent in direct proportion to the
degree of self understanding which man achieves. If my
only access to the world is through myself (and how can we
possibly deny this?) then the more transparent I am to my-
self, the more clearly I see others and the world around me.
Dasein-recognition frees me from egocentrism for the assump-
tion of my place in the unity of Being.
It is a mistake to see man as the "absolute center of
all things" in Heidegger's thought. What is at the center
of all things in Heidegger's philosophy is Nothing. This
is the reason I chose to use Eliot's figure of speech, "the
still point", in the title of this thesis: "Without the
still point there would be no dance but there is only the
dance"; "Without Being, whose unfathomable and unmanif est
essence /emphasis mine7 is vouchsafed us by the Nothing in
essential dread, everything that 'is' would remain in
Beinglessness ( Sein-losigkeit ) . " H7
Acknowledging that man does play a most important role
in Heidegger's philosophy, we are not "circling incessantly
about" him because to "circle incessantly about" is to at-
tempt to know ontically. It is not man in the ontical sense
1^See p . 1 , supra .
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that is studied by Heidegger, but rather the person that I
am- -the entity which is distinguished by questioning its
own existence and is ontologically known in that role of
questioner. In drawing attention to Dasein, Heidegger is
pointing to the error of trying to know Being through en-
tities which we are not, without previously having really
come to terms with the problem of how such knowing is pos-
sible
.
Assuming that Versenyi would grant me my uniqueness,
then my way of approaching the world will be unique (no
matter how similar it may be to the approach of someone
else). Since my way of approaching the world is my way of
being, then my way of being is also unique. 1^8 I have no
way of approaching the world except through my unique way
of being. My uniqueness is the sum total of all the factors
that contribute to my wholeness. I am "thrown" into the
world with certain characteristics, certain limitations
(which are influencing factors in my potentiality)
.
I grow
up in a world which is bounded by particular restrictions
and defined by those closest to me in my environment. As I
mature, I give some of these definitions priority over
others and so increase my degree of uniqueness. By the time
that I begin the serious inquiry into Being, I have chosen
I48xt seems important to me that we bear in mind that
the primary use of the word "being" (with a lower case "b")
is as a participle--and sometimes as a gerund--but not as
a substantive. Being is not a property or quality of man.
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definitions not only from my own personal environment, but
from my larger historical environment, and have at least
partially organized these choices into some kind of personal
order, further accenting my uniqueness. Thus I am unique
biologically, psychologically, and historically. Whatever
I disclose of the world of my experience will have been
filtered through this unique entity which I am
. Since
nothing in the world is disclosed except through being made
explicit and since man is the only entity who is able to
explicate his understanding, then the world is dependent for
its disclosure on man. Man is the only entity who feels
compelled to inquire about the meaning of his being in the
world and to relate to others through the communication of
the understanding gained. But this inquiry does not reduce
the world to a "complex of Dasein's concerns".
The essent is not changed by our questioning.
It remains what it is and as it is. Our questioning
is after all only a psycho-spiritual process in us
which, whatever course it may take, cannot in any
way affect the essent it self
.
1 ^9
When Versenyi speaks of Dasein "concerned about its own
Being" he speaks as if Being were something which could be
fragmented and doled out in shares, but, as Heidegger says:
Being-there is "in every case mine" means neither
"posited through me" nor "apportioned to an indi-
vidual ego". Being-there is itself by virtue of its
essential relation to being in general . 1 50
1^Introduction to Metaphysics
,
p . 29 .
1 50ibid.
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We must keep in mind that Heidegger has defined Being
as presence. Presence is not something which can be so
doled out. My being (and this, we must remember, is a
present participle) is that which makes it possible for me
to concern myself about Being. Being is not a property of
man. It is a way of relating to the world.
Versenyi’s reference to "all that is in the world
/being7 encountered as a utensil" betrays a failure to
understand the way in which we come to authentically "know"
the entities in our environment
.
^ 51 We encounter en-
tities as utensils, but in becoming aware of this way of
encounter as potential for knowing, our relationship to
those entities undergoes radical change. We can only be-
come aware of our concernful involvement in the world when
the ready-to-hand character of entities has penetrated our
consciousness to the extent that we are compelled to make
explicit our understanding. It seems reasonable to say
that in his role as a surgeon, a man improves with ex-
perience because he becomes more familiar or better ac-
quainted with his instruments, including not only scalpel
and forceps but his hands, his nerves, his moods, his
reactions, his ability--in short, himself. Should we ex-
pect any less of man in his role as Inquirer?
1 51see n. 31
,
p. 16 supra .
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In saying "here not only truth but even Being is lo-
cated in the human understanding", Versenyi mis-states
Heidegger's premise that Being is disclosed in the world
only through the human understanding. When Heidegger says,
Language is the house of Being.
. . . Whoever thinks or
creates in words is a guardian of this dwelling "
,
1 52 he is
saying that when I speak authentically and you hear me we
are, during our speaking and hearing, bestowing meaning on
that which has revealed itself to us through our guardian-
ship. If Being seems at times to speak in contradictions
it is not the fault of Being but the fault of the inter-
preter of that speaking. All speaking is at once a reveal-
ing and a concealing. If men shared no understanding of
anything, then we could perhaps doubt that we are, as
Heidegger says, "a single conversation" but when personal
experience yields something we have found— or later find-
expressed by another human being, then we are forced to ask
ourselves what it means. The recognition of kinship and
the resulting questions put an end to alienation. As
Nietzsche so eloquently said, in reference to his discovery
of Spinoza’s writing, "My solitude
. . .
is no more. It
has become a dialogue with another man. "153
^ 5%art in Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism", tr
.
Edgar
Lohner, William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, op. cit
.
,
p. 271.
1 53Letter from Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck, July 30,
1 88 1 . I first read this letter in a periodical some years
ago. I copied the letter but without noting the source.
Later I saw it in Kurt Leidecker, Nietzsche, Unpublished
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2) In making his second major criticism, Versenyi
write s
:
4H great philosophers knew the restlessness of human
reason, its urge to go on to the limits of its ownfinitude and, in the end, to transcend them. But
while these men felt the power of this urge they
resisted its compulsion and saw the futility and
philosophically self-defeating nature of a leap
beyond the edge of rationality. ... It is one
thing to recognize this all-too-human urge, and
quite another to abandon oneself to it so com-
pletely that one is, like Heidegger, carried far
beyond the realm of responsible thought. 1 54
The first and most obvious objection to this charge is
that most great philosophers have responded to the urge to
go beyond the limits of their own finitude. Heidegger may
be unique in Western thought in saying that there is
Nothing beyond. When others have reached the limit, they
have posited God, the Idea of Good, World Reason, Divine
Intellect, etc., or else, as in the East, they have taken
the leap and acknowledged the Nothing. This going beyond
is metaphysics itself and surely Versenyi is not excluding
the metaphysicians from the roll of great philosophers.
Secondly, in speaking of the urge to transcend the
limits as an "all-too-human" urge, Versenyi casts a slur on
being human. Is he speaking from the Garden of Eden and in
Letters (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), p. 83. I
prefer
,
and have used, the translation which I read first,
although the differences would not seem significant to many.
1 54xJaszlo Versenyi, op
.
cit
.
, pp. 174-5.
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the context of original sin? Why does man have this urge?
Is it not because he "knows" (the knowing which Heidegger
refers to as the primordial understanding) that there is
mystery and because he must (to the extent that he is fully
human, i.e., actively questioning) attempt to plumb this
mystery, even to the edge of the abyss? If we deny this
urge and turn our backs on those who have the courage to
respond to it, we impoverish ourselves, and our turned backs
will not even be noticed by those who press on to greater
under standing
.
It is difficult to accept a criticism of Heidegger
which is worded almost exclusively in meanings which
Heidegger has rejected. Heidegger has rejected "reason" as
a translation of A oy os in favor of "discourse", and sees
discourse as a mode of being. Conversing is a way of exist-
ing. Now what are the limits of A ova s ? Dasein converses in
words, in oils, in clay, in stone, in the sounds of music,
the baking of a loaf of bread, the nurturing of a child or
a garden. The finite limit to a particular Dasein' s con-
versing is death--nothing else--and even death is not a
limitation if Dasein has so expressed his understanding that
he lives on in it.
It is strange that the major portion of this work of
Versenyi's is an emotional diatribe in which he constantly
refers to Heidegger's "failure", yet his closing words are
an affirmation of Heidegger's thesis that philosophizing is
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a genuine way of speaking and that in speaking man finds a
reason for being.
Only by keeping it /philosophy alive can man--the
metaphysical, self-concerned
,
practical being--hope
to keep himself alive in the fullness and richness
his worldly
,
practical, onto—teleological human
existence
.
1 55
1 55ibid
.
,
p. 198.
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